Germany's alternative path

[islington]

I don't normally comment on 'alternate' history, let alone start threads, on the grounds that actual history offers more than enough to keep us busy.

But here's something I've sometimes wondered about.

While one needn't go all the way with the 'War Guilt' the victorious Allies forced Gemany to acknowledge at Versailles, I'd certainly argue that German foreign policy up to, and including, WW1 was both aggressive and clumsy, a particularly unfortunate combination on the part of a major power. Not only did this contribute to, arguably cause, a general war that can only be described as catastrophic, not least for Germany herself; it was also, surely, unnecessary.

For in the decades preceding WW1 Germany's position was an enviable one. Her population and industrial production were growing rapidly so that in both respects she surpassed the UK by 1914, and her rate of growth was considerably greater. She completely dominated the ramshackle Austrohungarian Empire; France was militarily quite strong but industrially weak, essentially a fading power; Italy still relatively backward; and Russia even more so. In this situation, surely, the last thing Germany needed was a major war; indeed, such a war was the only imaginable contingency that might derail her progress toward a dominant position in Europe. I'd argue, therefore, that so far from throwing her weight around in the way she did, Germany's foreign policy at this time should have been of a pacific nature: remaining well-armed, of course, for no one knows what the future holds, but doing all she could to defuse crises, foster peaceful relations between the major European states, and allowing herself the space to continue to grow economically and in population and gradually integrate the economies of other states, especially Austria, the Low Countries and Scandinavia, into a closer and closer association with her own.

If Germany had not gone to war in 1914, and instead had managed to maintain her rate of progress over the next fifteen or twenty years, by the 1930s her position in Europe would have been unassailable. And to achieve this, all she had to do was: nothing. Just carry on doing what she was already doing in terms of growth, and strive to avoid anything disruptive like a major war.

Trying to look at things from a German point of view, isn't that an outcome far preferable to what actually happened? Why didn't they do it? 

  

[Pete Whitehead]

Obviously they didn't do it because they were..

Jan 13, 2024 20:18:06 GMT Forfarshire Conservative said:

Europe's most progressive and forward thinking nation

[carlton43]

Jan 14, 2024 19:09:13 GMT islington said:

I don't normally comment on 'alternate' history, let alone start threads, on the grounds that actual history offers more than enough to keep us busy.

But here's something I've sometimes wondered about.

While one needn't go all the way with the 'War Guilt' the victorious Allies forced Gemany to acknowledge at Versailles, I'd certainly argue that German foreign policy up to, and including, WW1 was both aggressive and clumsy, a particularly unfortunate combination on the part of a major power. Not only did this contribute to, arguably cause, a general war that can only be described as catastrophic, not least for Germany herself; it was also, surely, unnecessary.

For in the decades preceding WW1 Germany's position was an enviable one. Her population and industrial production were growing rapidly so that in both respects she surpassed the UK by 1914, and her rate of growth was considerably greater. She completely dominated the ramshackle Austrohungarian Empire; France was militarily quite strong but industrially weak, essentially a fading power; Italy still relatively backward; and Russia even more so. In this situation, surely, the last thing Germany needed was a major war; indeed, such a war was the only imaginable contingency that might derail her progress toward a dominant position in Europe. I'd argue, therefore, that so far from throwing her weight around in the way she did, Germany's foreign policy at this time should have been of a pacific nature: remaining well-armed, of course, for no one knows what the future holds, but doing all she could to defuse crises, foster peaceful relations between the major European states, and allowing herself the space to continue to grow economically and in population and gradually integrate the economies of other states, especially Austria, the Low Countries and Scandinavia, into a closer and closer association with her own.

If Germany had not gone to war in 1914, and instead had managed to maintain her rate of progress over the next fifteen or twenty years, by the 1930s her position in Europe would have been unassailable. And to achieve this, all she had to do was: nothing. Just carry on doing what she was already doing in terms of growth, and strive to avoid anything disruptive like a major war.

Trying to look at things from a German point of view, isn't that an outcome far preferable to what actually happened? Why didn't they do it? 

  

But surely that is a model even more appropriate to Britain?  We should tried to ensure there was no war as well and avoided involvement if one arose.  Our world markets would have had less competition and our currency and reserves would have improved if we had been non-combatant.

[Forfarshire Conservative]

Germany was the most progressive and forward thinking country in Europe. British boys fighting for 'freedom' were fighting and killing German boys who had a better welfare system and the vote. For 'freedom'. Also, all you have to do is look at what happened when the war was over. Mass political debate, the cultural renaissance of Weimar etc. Bauhaus architecture, foundations of modern cinema via M, Metropolis and Walter Ruttman's 'Berlin: Symphony of a Great City', which was essentially the world's first documentary. A lot of that would still have happened given the antecedents were already there.

My revisionist take is also that the Entente was worse in relation to aggressiveness and odiousness.

On the aggressive foreign policy point, it's unfair to condemn Germany solely or to talk about war guilt. Russia was an aggressively expansionist power. They had not only conducted a Cold War with us across Central Asia to threaten India, they were also hellbent on taking down Turkey in the name of being the Third Rome. Sean McMeekin shows this really well by examining the figures, documentary evidence etc. that was emanating from Chorister's Bridge. Moreover, it had to start a war soon, and it knew it. Turkey was purchasing two dreadnoughts from Britain which would have turned the Black Sea into a Turkish lake. The Russians knew they had to act, and that's why there was detailed plans for an invasion of Constantinople, including via amphibious assault.

Further, you have France. France prior to 1914 is the definition, the archetype, of an expansionist, revisionist and revanchist power. Just look at the materials they taught in French schools about Alsace-Lorraine. They were teaching their children that some sort of showdown with Germany was inevitable, and the French nation was aching for revenge. They were going to start a war eventually.

Finally, there's 'plucky' little Serbia. Serbia was an unstable regicidal dictatorship, with a ethnic ultranationalist terrorist organisation looming over the whole country. They were on a reactionary crusade to destroy the Habsburg entity, whilst the next generation of Habsburgs wanted to reform.

With all that happening on the Reich's borders, is it any wonder the Reich was paranoid and aggressive on the international stage? Yes, the Kaiser had his faults, yes the Reich was too aggressive, but responsibility for the war? No.

Also, Britain had a choice to make. It could have sat back and tried to bridge the gap, and allowed the inevitable, quick German victory, to happen and then push for moderation. It did not though because of the aggressive anti-German atmosphere in Britain at the time. You had much of parliament itching for a war with Germany, and you had the hysterical press and popular culture always speculating about a possible German invasion. The stories from the time are quite remarkable. It is clear therefore, that Britain was also guilty for stoking the atmosphere too.

[carlton43]

Jan 14, 2024 22:15:43 GMT Forfarshire Conservative said:

Germany was the most progressive and forward thinking country in Europe. British boys fighting for 'freedom' were fighting and killing German boys who had a better welfare system and the vote. For 'freedom'. Also, all you have to do is look at what happened when the war was over. Mass political debate, the cultural renaissance of Weimar etc. Bauhaus architecture, foundations of modern cinema via M, Metropolis and Walter Ruttman's 'Berlin: Symphony of a Great City', which was essentially the world's first documentary. A lot of that would still have happened given the antecedents were already there.

My revisionist take is also that the Entente was worse in relation to aggressiveness and odiousness.

On the aggressive foreign policy point, it's unfair to condemn Germany solely or to talk about war guilt. Russia was an aggressively expansionist power. They had not only conducted a Cold War with us across Central Asia to threaten India, they were also hellbent on taking down Turkey in the name of being the Third Rome. Sean McMeekin shows this really well by examining the figures, documentary evidence etc. that was emanating from Chorister's Bridge. Moreover, it had to start a war soon, and it knew it. Turkey was purchasing two dreadnoughts from Britain which would have turned the Black Sea into a Turkish lake. The Russians knew they had to act, and that's why there was detailed plans for an invasion of Constantinople, including via amphibious assault.

Further, you have France. France prior to 1914 is the definition, the archetype, of an expansionist, revisionist and revanchist power. Just look at the materials they taught in French schools about Alsace-Lorraine. They were teaching their children that some sort of showdown with Germany was inevitable, and the French nation was aching for revenge. They were going to start a war eventually.

Finally, there's 'plucky' little Serbia. Serbia was an unstable regicidal dictatorship, with a ethnic ultranationalist terrorist organisation looming over the whole country. They were on a reactionary crusade to destroy the Habsburg entity, whilst the next generation of Habsburgs wanted to reform.

With all that happening on the Reich's borders, is it any wonder the Reich was paranoid and aggressive on the international stage? Yes, the Kaiser had his faults, yes the Reich was too aggressive, but responsibility for the war? No.

Also, Britain had a choice to make. It could have sat back and tried to bridge the gap, and allowed the inevitable, quick German victory, to happen and then push for moderation. It did not though because of the aggressive anti-German atmosphere in Britain at the time. You had much of parliament itching for a war with Germany, and you had the hysterical press and popular culture always speculating about a possible German invasion. The stories from the time are quite remarkable. It is clear therefore, that Britain was also guilty for stoking the atmosphere too.

That is a quite remarkably confused, old-fashioned and absurdist reading of the history of that time.  It does not deserve the epithet 'revisionist' as it is so inept and just plain wrong about virtually everything.  We know you have German connections and sympathies, but pull the other one with the iron cross bells on it!! 

[Davıd Boothroyd]

Germany in 1914 may have had a wider franchise and a more effective welfare system, but its foreign and war policy were dictated by the Kaiser and not the Reichstag.

[Forfarshire Conservative]

Jan 15, 2024 0:25:00 GMT Davıd Boothroyd said:

Germany in 1914 may have had a wider franchise and a more effective welfare system, but its foreign and war policy were dictated by the Kaiser and not the Reichstag.

Yes, and I did not claim otherwise. It is this that those who seek to prosecute Germany for the war as a key part of their case. Their overall conclusion is wrong however. It would also have been remiss of me however to not point out that it is a myth, at best, that British Tommies were fighting for freedom. They weren't. The average working class German had more political rights than the average working class Briton. That's just a fact. The Great War was not some Goveish fight for freedom and against aggression, it was an immense tragedy in which the Entente powers played an as important, or, in my view, more important part in stoking than others.

[Forfarshire Conservative]

Jan 14, 2024 23:54:36 GMT carlton43 said:

Jan 14, 2024 22:15:43 GMT Forfarshire Conservative said:

Germany was the most progressive and forward thinking country in Europe. British boys fighting for 'freedom' were fighting and killing German boys who had a better welfare system and the vote. For 'freedom'. Also, all you have to do is look at what happened when the war was over. Mass political debate, the cultural renaissance of Weimar etc. Bauhaus architecture, foundations of modern cinema via M, Metropolis and Walter Ruttman's 'Berlin: Symphony of a Great City', which was essentially the world's first documentary. A lot of that would still have happened given the antecedents were already there.

My revisionist take is also that the Entente was worse in relation to aggressiveness and odiousness.

On the aggressive foreign policy point, it's unfair to condemn Germany solely or to talk about war guilt. Russia was an aggressively expansionist power. They had not only conducted a Cold War with us across Central Asia to threaten India, they were also hellbent on taking down Turkey in the name of being the Third Rome. Sean McMeekin shows this really well by examining the figures, documentary evidence etc. that was emanating from Chorister's Bridge. Moreover, it had to start a war soon, and it knew it. Turkey was purchasing two dreadnoughts from Britain which would have turned the Black Sea into a Turkish lake. The Russians knew they had to act, and that's why there was detailed plans for an invasion of Constantinople, including via amphibious assault.

Further, you have France. France prior to 1914 is the definition, the archetype, of an expansionist, revisionist and revanchist power. Just look at the materials they taught in French schools about Alsace-Lorraine. They were teaching their children that some sort of showdown with Germany was inevitable, and the French nation was aching for revenge. They were going to start a war eventually.

Finally, there's 'plucky' little Serbia. Serbia was an unstable regicidal dictatorship, with a ethnic ultranationalist terrorist organisation looming over the whole country. They were on a reactionary crusade to destroy the Habsburg entity, whilst the next generation of Habsburgs wanted to reform.

With all that happening on the Reich's borders, is it any wonder the Reich was paranoid and aggressive on the international stage? Yes, the Kaiser had his faults, yes the Reich was too aggressive, but responsibility for the war? No.

Also, Britain had a choice to make. It could have sat back and tried to bridge the gap, and allowed the inevitable, quick German victory, to happen and then push for moderation. It did not though because of the aggressive anti-German atmosphere in Britain at the time. You had much of parliament itching for a war with Germany, and you had the hysterical press and popular culture always speculating about a possible German invasion. The stories from the time are quite remarkable. It is clear therefore, that Britain was also guilty for stoking the atmosphere too.

That is a quite remarkably confused, old-fashioned and absurdist reading of the history of that time.  It does not deserve the epithet 'revisionist' as it is so inept and just plain wrong about virtually everything.  We know you have German connections and sympathies, but pull the other one with the iron cross bells on it!! 

I am not surprised you take this view given your sympathies. However, it isn't 'wrong', you just don't agree. There is a subtle difference, and I can back up everything I said with references and a reading list. Bluntly, the Great War was not some crusade against German aggression, and nor can the bulk of the blame be placed in Berlin. My heritage, whilst something I am proud of, is not something that informs my view in the main on this. It is the absurd canonisation of the manufactured war aims for the Entente effort, and it is the biased Anglophone reading of the history. It is simply a fact that the most revisionist continental powers were the Entente powers. Alsace-Lorraine, the former Byzantine lands, Yugoslavia, and, later, Italian ambition in the Adriatic: they're all overlooked and all were of supreme importance in why the war started, and developed the way it did. Nor is it old fashioned, as your, err, robust reaction demonstrates. The old fashioned view is right up the dominant narrative's alley, with the likes of Fritz Fischer.

[J.G.Harston]

Jan 15, 2024 0:25:00 GMT Davıd Boothroyd said:

Germany in 1914 may have had a wider franchise and a more effective welfare system, but its foreign and war policy were dictated by the Kaiser and not the Reichstag.

The expansionist German empire consisted of one small sausage factory in Tanganyika....

[Defenestrated Fipplebox]

Avoiding WW1 would have been better for Germany and the UK as neither would have financially hobbled themselves and the financial dominance of the US would have been delayed. WW1 was a result of the rolling snow ball effect, it would have needed different choices years before to prevent it.

[Sibboleth]

Jan 15, 2024 2:00:22 GMT Forfarshire Conservative said:

The average working class German had more political rights than the average working class Briton. That's just a fact.

No, that is just not correct at all. Firstly, political rights extend far beyond the franchise and on these issues there is really no comparison, none, even with things being more contested in Edwardian Britain than today. This extended directly to electoral practice: the electoral system was consciously rigged against 'radicals' (though the grotesque malapportionment was more effective there than the two-round system), and manipulation, pressure and the undermining of the secret ballot was common in the countryside, especially in North Germany and East of the Elbe. Secondly, state governments were extremely powerful in Germany and these were generally not elected via a particularly democratic franchise: Prussia still used the Dreiklassenwahlrecht and there were states with even less democratic systems. Some did not even have elections. Thirdly, by the early 20th century the proportion of the adult population with the right to vote in Reichstag elections was not greatly higher than the proportion with a right to vote in British General Elections: because the rental value needed to qualify for the franchise in Britain remained at that set in 1867, inflation had done a marvelous job in extending the franchise to the working man. By the 1900s the group of men being discriminated against were primarily the young. Meanwhile the 'universal manhood suffrage' used to elect the Reichstag was not exactly universal in practice: there were a range of restrictions that whittled down the eligible pool of voters quite substantially. The percentage was still higher in Germany, of course, but not to the extent that might be expected. Finally, the German electorate had no means of deciding the composition of the government of the day as the government was not dependent on the support of the Reichstag: it was a democratically elected legislature (by the standards of the time) but it was not a democratic legislature. It could cause trouble over finance bills (and often did) but no more.

[finsobruce]

Jan 15, 2024 2:21:17 GMT J.G.Harston said:

Jan 15, 2024 0:25:00 GMT Davıd Boothroyd said:

Germany in 1914 may have had a wider franchise and a more effective welfare system, but its foreign and war policy were dictated by the Kaiser and not the Reichstag.

The expansionist German empire consisted of one small sausage factory in Tanganyika....

German South West Africa m'lud?

[The Bishop]

Whatever you think of his take on WW1 more generally, credit to Forfarshire Conservative for not buying the "WW1 was good, actually" revisionism of some right wing historians.

And yes the post war Versailles settlement only stored up trouble for the future - the French lust for vengeance (even if understandable) proved quite disastrous.

[carlton43]

Jan 15, 2024 2:16:26 GMT Forfarshire Conservative said:

Jan 14, 2024 23:54:36 GMT carlton43 said:

That is a quite remarkably confused, old-fashioned and absurdist reading of the history of that time.  It does not deserve the epithet 'revisionist' as it is so inept and just plain wrong about virtually everything.  We know you have German connections and sympathies, but pull the other one with the iron cross bells on it!! 

I am not surprised you take this view given your sympathies. However, it isn't 'wrong', you just don't agree. There is a subtle difference, and I can back up everything I said with references and a reading list. Bluntly, the Great War was not some crusade against German aggression, and nor can the bulk of the blame be placed in Berlin. My heritage, whilst something I am proud of, is not something that informs my view in the main on this. It is the absurd canonisation of the manufactured war aims for the Entente effort, and it is the biased Anglophone reading of the history. It is simply a fact that the most revisionist continental powers were the Entente powers. Alsace-Lorraine, the former Byzantine lands, Yugoslavia, and, later, Italian ambition in the Adriatic: they're all overlooked and all were of supreme importance in why the war started, and developed the way it did. Nor is it old fashioned, as your, err, robust reaction demonstrates. The old fashioned view is right up the dominant narrative's alley, with the likes of Fritz Fischer.

But your original post is a mish-mash of cherry-picked nuggets many of which are quite irrelevant to the centrality of your contention that Germany was the wronged party in the lead up to the Great War. 

The garbled references to narrowly chosen examples of advances in socialism and democracy and ascendancy in some of the arts and culture do not bear upon the preparation and planning for war that had been taking place for decades.  The Franco-Prussian War had been a preamble to what was to come. 

That and wounded pride over their lateness and relative lack of success in the Scramble for Africa.  The more notable achievements for their undoubted war aims were the unification of a Germanic hegemony headed by Prussian efficiency and the eradication of mini states, internal borders and burdensome customs controls and duties.  Being a bit later into industrialization they were getting ahead in innovation, efficiency, competitiveness, quality and penetration of world markets. 

Their navy was growing fast but lacked the bases needed to utilise it to any form of effectiveness outside the Baltic, North Sea, English Channel (together the Greater German Ocean!) and that drove progressive war minds into the devastating idea of what was to become massive investment in U-Boats. 

This was a country smarting at not being what it saw as its rightful place as the leader and master of continental Europe, led by a partially disabled Kaiser with an overt desire to compensate for his own inner hurts from royal sleights from Russia and Britain who thought him a bit of a fool and the runt of the family.  In many ways the period can be seen at least partially as a sibling rivalry spat writ hugely large and with terrible effects. 

Russia is not the ogre in this anti-German plot.  They have forever feared encirclement by hostile neighbours coupled with a need for ice free deep water ports.  So the Pacific coast, the Black Seas and Dardanelles, lower Baltic coast/Jutland have always been paramount objectives and seen to be matters of life and death to them.  Of course they were concerned about the Ottoman Empire and Turkish objectives aided and abetted by Germany; by Persia/Iraq and perceived British penetration to secure oil and potential bases; the open sore of British India lowering on a border; China and the Islamic stans.  Russia may be vast with huge resources but it is a nightmare to defend as any player of risk knows.  It has always felt insecure and vulnerable and rightly suspected the machinations of others against it. In that respect nothing has changed at all which is why it still feels a need to behave as it does.  The West mishandled the Soviet revolution and even more the Fall of the Soviet Empire.  Germany has always seen Russia as a threat and been envious of its resources and space and frankly it still is and will one day have another go at the push to the east because it is inbuilt to the very fibre of the Germanic psyche and culture.

[mrpastelito]

Annexing Alsace-Lorraine in 1871 and humiliating France wasn't a clever move.

[islington]

Jan 15, 2024 2:00:22 GMT Forfarshire Conservative said:

Jan 15, 2024 0:25:00 GMT Davıd Boothroyd said:

Germany in 1914 may have had a wider franchise and a more effective welfare system, but its foreign and war policy were dictated by the Kaiser and not the Reichstag.

Yes, and I did not claim otherwise. It is this that those who seek to prosecute Germany for the war as a key part of their case. Their overall conclusion is wrong however. It would also have been remiss of me however to not point out that it is a myth, at best, that British Tommies were fighting for freedom. They weren't. The average working class German had more political rights than the average working class Briton. That's just a fact. The Great War was not some Goveish fight for freedom and against aggression, it was an immense tragedy in which the Entente powers played an as important, or, in my view, more important part in stoking than others.

There is indeed much that is positive that could be said about Germany as she was in 1914, including the social welfare system and the very wide franchise (by contemporary standards).

But in my view you are overstating the case, and edgbaston is quite right to point out that there's more to political liberty than simply having the vote. There is also the question of the powers of the body you are voting for, and on this point Germany's 'progressive and forward thinking' credentials are much less persuasive. I'm not saying that the Reichstag was a mere talking shop, because clearly it was a lot more than that - it possessed, and exercised, meaningful powers and at times it caused significant problems for the government. But at no point did it aspire to take responsibility for the overall thrust of German policy whether domestically or internationally: that always resided firmly with the Emperor and with the Chancellor whom he appointed and, if thought fit, dismissed. Only in the very dying days of imperial Germany, in October 1918, were changes adopted that made the Chancellor's tenure conditional on the confidence of the Reichstag - and by then, of course, it was too late.

Britain and France, by contrast, were streets ahead of Germany in having the executive reliant on the confidence of Parliament; and as for the franchise, in the case of France it was even wider than in Germany.

Regarding foreign policy in the years before the war, in my original post I explicitly distanced myself from the concept of War Guilt as imposed on Germany by the victorious allies in 1918. You are right: the blame by no means falls exclusively on Germany. If you want my more nuanced view, it is that if you want to look only at the few weeks before WW1 broke out, i.e. at the July crisis of 1914, then I do feel that Germany must take the biggest share of the blame (i) because of a lack of clarity at the highest levels of government about what they were trying to achieve and about whether or not their militant stance was a bluff (and if it was a bluff, what their plan was for climbing down if it was called), and (ii), even worse, the virtual blank cheque given to Austria in respect of actions against Serbia, which effectively subcontracted control of German foreign policy to a nervous and inept subordinate partner. This is not to say that Germany was solely responsible, though; other powers also contributed. For example, I think several members of the British political and diplomatic leadership in 1914 frankly acknowledged after the war that they could and should have signalled much more clearly that whether or not Germany was bluffing, they (the British) were not.

But my basic point was broader, and applied to a much longer perspective than just the few frantic weeks of July 1914. It is that, looking back over the twenty or thirty years before the war, Germany, because of her rapid economic expansion, actually had more to gain than any other power from the maintenance of the peace; and as a corollary of that, more to lose than anyone from the outbreak of a major war.

This isn't just hindsight: Bismarck was of exactly this view and he made strenuous efforts to maintain peace in Europe. His method was simple but logical: reasoning that France would not dare to fight Germany on her own (and if she tried, would be rapidly defeated), he sought to deny the French any possible major ally and to this end he entered into agreements with Austria and Russia and sought to maintain good relations with Britain. It was only after Bismarck's dismissal in 1890 that Germany allowed her treaty with Russia to lapse, thus opening up for the French the opportunity, eagerly seized by them, to enter into an alliance with Russia. And from this point German diplomacy became more and more abrasive and quarrelsome, gratuitously intervening in issues where no important German interest was at stake and tending all the time to alienate Britain. And so, step by step, the alliances that were to fight WW1 gradually took shape. 

I'm not saying that Germany's diplomacy, across the period from 1890 to 1914, was necessarily worse than any of the other powers. Britain and France certainly played their part, and so, more particularly, did Russia and Austria. But I am saying that Germany, more than any of the others, had much to gain from the continuance of peace. Her foreign policy should have reflected this priority but after 1890, it didn't.       

[gaitskellite]

Perhaps one, 'What if?' is what if Kaiser Wilhelm II had died as a child - two of his younger brothers both died before the age of 12. The Kaiser was very influential in the development of Gemran militarism, his various foreign policy blunders did a lot to alienate public opinion overseas in the run-up to 1914.

On the other hand Wilhelm's younger brother Heinrich was totally different and had much more in common with his father. Heinrich's overseas visits proved very popular and improved Germany's reputation abroad. Henry was an anglophile, and both physically and in terms of his love of ships and the sea had more in common with his cousin George V of Britain than he had with his older brother.

[Forfarshire Conservative]

Jan 15, 2024 8:24:09 GMT Sibboleth said:

Jan 15, 2024 2:00:22 GMT Forfarshire Conservative said:

The average working class German had more political rights than the average working class Briton. That's just a fact.

No, that is just not correct at all. Firstly, political rights extend far beyond the franchise and on these issues there is really no comparison, none, even with things being more contested in Edwardian Britain than today. This extended directly to electoral practice: the electoral system was consciously rigged against 'radicals' (though the grotesque malapportionment was more effective there than the two-round system), and manipulation, pressure and the undermining of the secret ballot was common in the countryside, especially in North Germany and East of the Elbe. Secondly, state governments were extremely powerful in Germany and these were generally not elected via a particularly democratic franchise: Prussia still used the Dreiklassenwahlrecht and there were states with even less democratic systems. Some did not even have elections. Thirdly, by the early 20th century the proportion of the adult population with the right to vote in Reichstag elections was not greatly higher than the proportion with a right to vote in British General Elections: because the rental value needed to qualify for the franchise in Britain remained at that set in 1867, inflation had done a marvelous job in extending the franchise to the working man. By the 1900s the group of men being discriminated against were primarily the young. Meanwhile the 'universal manhood suffrage' used to elect the Reichstag was not exactly universal in practice: there were a range of restrictions that whittled down the eligible pool of voters quite substantially. The percentage was still higher in Germany, of course, but not to the extent that might be expected. Finally, the German electorate had no means of deciding the composition of the government of the day as the government was not dependent on the support of the Reichstag: it was a democratically elected legislature (by the standards of the time) but it was not a democratic legislature. It could cause trouble over finance bills (and often did) but no more.

We all know the Kaisereich was an uneasy marriage between parliamentarianism and traditionalist monarchy. However, I must protest this characterisation of the imperial political system.

First and foremost, you need to define how you see suffrage. Is it the premier sign of an early democracy? In practice, many take that it is as one of the preeminent cornerstones of democratisation. I do, and I consider it a vitally important starting point in judging democratisation.

Moreover, the expanded franchise ensured a profound effect on German society and its unique setup. For instance, the very German phenomenon of mass participation in pre-existing clubs and churches, and their societies, had the effect of politicising the bulk of the population. Given this politicised population had the vote, unlike those in the UK, there was a more participatory atmosphere in Germany than here. Indeed, the franchise further had the effect of magnifying causes that would otherwise be local affairs here. What would be a local and forgotten problem in Glamorgan in the UK, in Germany, because of the extended franchise, got attention that would not otherwise have been received. Indeed, hundreds of thousands of people would sign petitions against specific imperial laws, a characteristic of participatory democracy. And yes, before it is said, I am obviously aware that in the UK there is a centuries long tradition of petitioning, most notably for this period would be the opposing petitions for and against women's suffrage. However, with the extended franchise in the Reich, it is again clear how the public had more of an option in making their say, unlike the UK, and unlike in your answer. Kulturkampf is a perfect example of this. The School Inspection Law in Prussia, 1871, was strongly contested and led to a fractious debate. Indeed, it wasn't really implemented in practice. In Germany, which had universal male suffrage from 1867 in the NGF until he collapse of the Reich in 1918-9, this proved the effectiveness of political participation. This is one of the reasons why I would argue turnout was so high. Yes, it was the same, in the mid-eighties percent, in Britain, but in Germany it encompassed more people. Whereas, in the UK, when universal suffrage was implemented turnout began to decline and would never again reach the pre-war highs of 86odd%. Even today, turnout is consistently higher in Germany than here.

I must also stress that there was a cultural difference in the Reich, which saw the role of parliament as not merely to take power, but to be in alliance with state power in a consensual manner. In that sense, the Reichstag was carrying out its job pretty well. This is not something you cite, but you should. British assumptions about adversarial parliamentary government are not necessarily repeatable, and, I'd argue, not necessarily antidemocratic. Any comparisons must make allowances for cultural differentiation. Further, one must ask, could a British style government have been formed? Unlike in the UK, where public opinion was and is today often deliberately put aside for the necessity of broad church coalitions, in Germany there was a vast range of representations in the Reichstag. From the antisemites, to the middle class economic self interest parties, to its largest party at the 1912 election, the SPD. I'm not even sure a Reichstag preeminent state could have worked in that environment. Frankly, it didn't a decade later.

When you refer to the violations of suffrage and the ways of supressing turnout, this is, of course, true. However, I would argue that it was a characteristic of late-nineteenth, early-twentieth century politics. As we all know, it occurred not only in Germany, but in the US, supposed land of the free, where voter fraud and suppression were commonplace. Even here in the UK the corruption of political practice was not unheard-of, despite the supposedly clean reputation of the Edwardian period, still held by some. France also, you had the Affaire des Fiches and others which were undemocratic and corrupt. Are we going to argue Germany, France, Britain and the US were equally undemocratic? Or would it be better to place these phenomenon in what I would argue are their correct historical context?

[Forfarshire Conservative]

Jan 15, 2024 10:39:54 GMT carlton43 said:

Jan 15, 2024 2:16:26 GMT Forfarshire Conservative said:

I am not surprised you take this view given your sympathies. However, it isn't 'wrong', you just don't agree. There is a subtle difference, and I can back up everything I said with references and a reading list. Bluntly, the Great War was not some crusade against German aggression, and nor can the bulk of the blame be placed in Berlin. My heritage, whilst something I am proud of, is not something that informs my view in the main on this. It is the absurd canonisation of the manufactured war aims for the Entente effort, and it is the biased Anglophone reading of the history. It is simply a fact that the most revisionist continental powers were the Entente powers. Alsace-Lorraine, the former Byzantine lands, Yugoslavia, and, later, Italian ambition in the Adriatic: they're all overlooked and all were of supreme importance in why the war started, and developed the way it did. Nor is it old fashioned, as your, err, robust reaction demonstrates. The old fashioned view is right up the dominant narrative's alley, with the likes of Fritz Fischer.

But your original post is a mish-mash of cherry-picked nuggets many of which are quite irrelevant to the centrality of your contention that Germany was the wronged party in the lead up to the Great War. 

The garbled references to narrowly chosen examples of advances in socialism and democracy and ascendancy in some of the arts and culture do not bear upon the preparation and planning for war that had been taking place for decades.  The Franco-Prussian War had been a preamble to what was to come. 

That and wounded pride over their lateness and relative lack of success in the Scramble for Africa.  The more notable achievements for their undoubted war aims were the unification of a Germanic hegemony headed by Prussian efficiency and the eradication of mini states, internal borders and burdensome customs controls and duties.  Being a bit later into industrialization they were getting ahead in innovation, efficiency, competitiveness, quality and penetration of world markets. 

Their navy was growing fast but lacked the bases needed to utilise it to any form of effectiveness outside the Baltic, North Sea, English Channel (together the Greater German Ocean!) and that drove progressive war minds into the devastating idea of what was to become massive investment in U-Boats. 

This was a country smarting at not being what it saw as its rightful place as the leader and master of continental Europe, led by a partially disabled Kaiser with an overt desire to compensate for his own inner hurts from royal sleights from Russia and Britain who thought him a bit of a fool and the runt of the family.  In many ways the period can be seen at least partially as a sibling rivalry spat writ hugely large and with terrible effects. 

Russia is not the ogre in this anti-German plot.  They have forever feared encirclement by hostile neighbours coupled with a need for ice free deep water ports.  So the Pacific coast, the Black Seas and Dardanelles, lower Baltic coast/Jutland have always been paramount objectives and seen to be matters of life and death to them.  Of course they were concerned about the Ottoman Empire and Turkish objectives aided and abetted by Germany; by Persia/Iraq and perceived British penetration to secure oil and potential bases; the open sore of British India lowering on a border; China and the Islamic stans.  Russia may be vast with huge resources but it is a nightmare to defend as any player of risk knows.  It has always felt insecure and vulnerable and rightly suspected the machinations of others against it. In that respect nothing has changed at all which is why it still feels a need to behave as it does.  The West mishandled the Soviet revolution and even more the Fall of the Soviet Empire.  Germany has always seen Russia as a threat and been envious of its resources and space and frankly it still is and will one day have another go at the push to the east because it is inbuilt to the very fibre of the Germanic psyche and culture.

I'm afraid my posts have to be constrained at the moment Carlton. I have little time presently, and that is why I basically merged what would ordinarily have been two answers into one. The only reason I began commenting on this thread to be honest is that I was tagged and felt the need to defend my view. This is why I talked about the importance of German progressivism, in the broadest definition of that word, with one about pre-war foreign policy.

I'll attempt to answer a couple of points here though.

On France, if you want to go all the way back, the Franco-Prussian War, and thus German unification, was an inevitability due to French action. It was the French and their continental expansionism which made German unification inevitable through their inculcation of German nationalism. Also, look at the geopolitical context of late nineteenth century Europe. Blut und Eisen, or rather a form of it, was inevitable too. Prussia, which as the predominant German power through military prowess and the Zollverein was going to be the German unifier, had to fight the Austrians and French. So even if one were to take your view, surely you'd have to eventually credit the French due to their creation of the situation that led to the loss of Alsace-Lorraine?

I also accept your point about the Kaiser. I don't go in for psychoanalysis of historical figures, but there really is a lot in what you say, and I agree with it. Cowes Week 1912 is a good example of his sense of inferiority compared with his cousins. However, it is not cherry picking if I point out that he did repeatedly try and keep the peace. He is too maligned, and I sense this in your post too, that he was some kind of proto-Hitler. He wasn't, and his actions, for instance, during the all important July Crisis show his typically bipolar nature. He did egg on the Austrians to take action, but that was because they really had to. The Black Hand's attack was a grotesque act of war, and yet when the ultimatum response came in he was pleased. In his view, Austria had achieved its aims without a fight and would be able to negotiate the others' too. One must therefore consider him in the round.

Moreover, Germany's understandable fears are overlooked in your response. You see Russia's sense of isolation, indefensibility and encirclement, but not Germany's. I therefore think my points about the expansionism of the Entente are perfectly relevant. France, Serbia, Russia, later Italy, all revisionist powers on or near its borders. Russia and France also had absurdist war aims too, and France kept trying to impose them well into the 1920s. During the occupation of the Ruhr in 1923, for example, the French were still trying to hack off a huge chunk of Western Germany, including setting up a separatist Rhenish state. Volker Ulrich and Frank McDonagh show this well in their respective histories of 1923 and the Weimar Period. 

Further, I think that Russian expansionism cannot merely be seen as defensive. Pan-Slavism, for instance, played a huge role in pre-war Russia's self image, foreign policy, and in its attitude to the Ottoman and Austrian Empires. This cannot be seen as defensive, it is pure imperial expansionism. Nor is the Dardanelles defensive to be honest.

Also, a question. Is it the case that your view of the Russian situation is that they need to expand to survive, because there's always going to be another Persia, another Polish salient, another needed port? If so, is this not a sign that Russia is ultimately untenable as a state so long as it has its paranoid attitude? The only way it will secure its situation is if it surrounds itself with voluntary friends, and that means an accommodation with the West. I have no sympathy therefore with their self-defeating aggressive attitude. It is a problem of their own making.

A final point before I have to go, Germany is not going to be marching East. NATO might, but Germany, like Japan, now has a huge pacifistic constituency that would make that impossible. There is no appetite to even reclaim the now Polish lands except among a tiny hardcore of Neo-Nazis.

[The Bishop]

Must say that those are two very cogent and well written posts, sir.