A contrafactual question (navy related)

[Deleted]

This is an old contrafactual question of mine (which has hitherto given paltry answers when I have tried it), but I thought I might get some qualified responses here from fx. Adam in Stroud. 

"What happens to the history of North America if Britannia doesn't rule the waves in the Atlantic 1660 to around 1770? (or even just 1700).  How does the presence of a hostile naval power in the North Atlantic influence English/British foreign policy?"

There is of course other butterfly effects as well regarding the creation of the British Empire in general and the consequences of a later Russian involvement in Western/Central European history. Presumably it also influences British economy that the country has to divert larger resources to the navy than IRL (as the naval strenght Britain obtained in the 18th century needs to happen earlier). 

Would the French/Nordic alliance be stable, or would England/Britain be able to break it up? (remember that a common interest in a fragmented and weak Germany was at the heart of the French/Swedish alliance).

Case: Sweden became a great power around 1630 after its successful intervention in the Thirty Years War. In 1658 the Swedes had conquered all of Denmark except the capital Copenhagen, which they unsuccessfully tried to capture several times. The Swedish state was thoroughly reorganized by chancellor Axel Oxenstierne 1610-20 and considered one of the two most modern in Europe (along with France). So we are not talking about a "renewed Kalmar Union", but a well organized, centralized state with a highly efficient bureaucracy capable of mobilizing all its resources. 

If they had been successful the Swedes could have more than doubled their population and increased their territory with the Realm of Denmark including Norway, the Faeroe Islands and Iceland (plus Holstein and colonies in West India, India, Greenland and the Gold Coast) and doubled their navy.
Sweden at the time ran one of most efficient military machines in Europe and also had one of the most efficient fiscal administrations of the day allowing the country to pull far above its weight. Most of the Baltic and German coastline as well as Finland was Swedish.

Naval power
The combined navy of the Nordic kingdoms would have been the second largest in Europe. Only Denmark and Sweden had navies in the Baltic Sea (Russia doesn't get one before 1700). So the United Kingdom of Scandinavia (UKS) could just leave a small fleet in the Baltic Sea and concentrate 80-90% of its naval forces in the Atlantic with Bergen or Trondheim in Norway as its main naval base.
Ever since The Thirty Years War Sweden was a loyal French ally. France would generally have the third largest fleet in Europe. The combined Nordic/French navies would make a formidable opponent for the Royal Navy.
The British would also be forced to divide their navy because the Nordic navy could access the Atlantic north of Scotland.

European navies in 1650 displacement in tonnes (these numbers are a bit disadvantageous to the Danish navy, so 55,000 may be more realistic)

Sweden + Denmark 50.000 (28.000 + 22.000)
Britain 49.000
Spain 30.000
Netherlands 29.000
Portugal ca. 25.000
France 21.000

# The French navy would become bigger than the other continental navies around 1665.

IRL Sweden's great power status collapsed 1718-21 at the end of the Great Nordic War, but I think a united Nordic kingdom would have the strength to keep its great power status for another 40-50 years. It would be in almost perpetual war with the Russians over control of the Baltics and eventually the Russians would get the upper hand due to their much larger population. But the Russians were way behind Western Europe and the modernizing project of Peter the Great becomes far more difficult with a strong enemy like a united Scandinavia. So I think 1760-70 is a realistic time for the defeat of UKS that would lead to its loss of great power status and the ascent of Russia.

[Deleted]

Come on someone, answer this - I want to know!

[Adam in Stroud]

Absolutely not my period, @odo but I'll have a stab at it.

I'd start by making some assumptions as to why Britain fails to become the dominant naval power. I suppose it has to be either due to some screw-up by the British - e.g. government neglects Navy, civil war (Jacobites?) a Jacobite restoration pursuing a pro-French foreign policy, or something; or alternatively, the British meet a successful competitor such as your interesting UKS idea.  (I imagine you could have a similar result in reverse if Christian of Denmark had been the great Protestant hope in the 30 Years War rather than Gustavus Adolphus.)

In the first option, Britain presumably simply never becomes a great power at all. It'd be a relatively insignificant power on the edge of Europe, with no overseas Empire and wracked by whatever problems had got it into that state in the first place; possibly ending up as a French client state.

In the second case, Britain is still in the mix but unable to secure a monopoly on North America.  I'd have thought that there might have been a fair chance of your UKS switching from a French alliance to a British one; Denmark and Britain were I think on pretty good terms in that period so I suspect there were favourable trade relationships, which might have influenced the UKS notwithstanding its Swedish origin - I imagine Denmark would still have been the more prosperous part of the kingdom, and the whole premise of UKS as an Atlantic power seems to me to imply prominent Danish interests in such a kingdom.  At least I imagine a UKS might have been less of a satellite of France and more of a force in its own right, and I can imagine important trade networks building up between it, the United Provinces and Great Britain.

If UKS remains in the French camp then presumably France comes out of the Anglo-French rivalry better, especially in naval terms, probably keeping Canada and Louisiana; I wonder if the Dutch might have done better in North America too, with Britain perhaps having to concede ground to the Dutch in order to secure alliance against the French and Scandinavians?

I'm not sure about your suggestion that Britain would have had to divert more resources to the Navy; given the resistance of the British Parliament to taxation to pay for armed forces (which was after all what most taxes went on at the time) I suspect that Britain would have just had to accept that she could not control the seas single-handedly, and look to make alliances to counter-act rivals. I have however heard it argued that the move to a large navy was important in stimulating the industrial revolution, in that firstly it required the development of the logistical and manufacturing skills that were needed, and secondly that prioritising the Navy rather than the army put government spending into manufacturing things - ships and cannon - rather than in employing large numbers of cannon fodder.  So if it did have the effect you suggest, that might have hastened industrialisation.

[Toylyyev]

There is a related attempt over at alternatehistory.com.

www.alternatehistory.com/forum/threads/a-scandinavian-king-on-the-throne-of-britain.209049/ [1]

And a pretty impressive one at that, particularly so with respect to the timeline of publication of the chapters. Now expanding on that that would bring the focus to another question, but here is an excerpt from it that should be topical here.

In the meantime, General Prim continued with his plans for an Iberian
Union between Spain and Portugal and a liberalization of the Spanish
political scene. He would see his plans come to fruitition with the
declaring of the Kingdom of Iberia being created on February 11, 1873
with the joint crown being given to Amadeo I.

With time a liberal Iberian Union would likely start to have effects in the Americas, resulting in perhaps something similar to a bilingual United States of Latin America sooner or later, with possibly a rather hefty civil war after some time, then a Spanish speaking Yankee pitch and the scientific literature of today might use another language.

Even if there would not have been a full union, there seems to be little reason to believe that the realm would not have seen eventually similarly sustained economic expansion than the liberal British tradition has produced in the north.

Polity structure may outdo naval ability for effect, or alternatively the latter may need what today is called soft power to lasting effect.

[1] The site is down til the 22nd, but there is google cache.

[Toylyyev]

Dec 21, 2016 8:38:12 GMT @sp said:

I'm still working on this, it raises so many points.

> there must be no amnesty for wrongdoers;
> there must be no rewriting of the past;

From the 2015 DUP manifesto.

They are an impressive heap, with exceptions only reinforcing the awe. What the Democrazia Cristiana should have been.

[Deleted]

I haven't answered Adam in Stroud because I wanted to see if I got more answers, but its probably time to move the discussion along.

Two initial points before I address yours (it takes quite a while before I get to England, but its likely necessary to elaborate on the case).

Firstly, what interests me is this specific case, not a scenario where Britain due to internal factors do not develop into a great power, and I should perhaps have made that clearer.

Secondly, Charles X Gustav had very specific plans about what to do if he conquered Copenagen, and these describe a state which would have been a Greater Sweden in all but name. He intended to a) incarcerate all male members of the Danish royal family on a castle and prevent them from procreating b) deport the Danish aristocracy to the Baltic countries and give them estates there as compensation for their Danish estates which were to be handed over to Swedish nobles, incl. newly ennobled Scottish and German mercenary commanders c) make Malmø the new capital of his kingdom d) raze Copenhagen to the ground and erase all traces of its existence, while deporting its merchants to Baltic towns. I personally doubt he would have razed Copenhagen to the ground as fantasies about destroying the capital of his enemy would have given way to more pragmatic calculations once he had conquered a (by Nordic standards) large and rich city, but by relocating the entire Danish elite to the Baltics (thus replacing a potentially rebellious and well-connected German elite with an isolated Danish, which would have been fully dependent on the Swedish state) he would have prevented Danish interests and foreign policy traditions from dominating the outlook of the new state.
That said Denmark had far more towns than Sweden (78 to 36 IIRC) and Øresund would have been the commercial center of gravity for the state. The Swedish elite would also have been somewhat danicized by the court relocating to Danish speaking Malmø and some of them taking over Danish estates, and since the two languages were quite close at the time (far closer than today) there would likely have developed one written form based on Swedish, but with significant Danish influence. But the new realm would essentially have been a larger version of the highly centralised and bureaucratic Swedish state.

Charles X Gustav died in 1660, but I think his plans would have been followed (in the main) after his dead (apart from Copenhagen).

Your points:

AS: “I imagine you could have a similar result in reverse if Christian of Denmark had been the great Protestant hope in the 30 Years War rather than Gustavus Adolphus.”

No, you can not really reverse the scenario. The extreme mobilization of resources Sweden managed 1630-1720 (at times seemingly stamping armies out of the ground) was only possible due to starting out with a less feudal and more “primitive” state which could be build up from the ground as a thouroughly modern entity. Denmark was far too feudal for that and had a powerful high nobility, which meticulously guarded its privileges including the right not to pay taxes. It would not have been possible to modernize and upgrade the Danish state to the same degree. 

AS: “I'd have thought that there might have been a fair chance of your UKS switching from a French alliance to a British one; Denmark and Britain were I think on pretty good terms in that period so I suspect there were favourable trade relationships, which might have influenced the UKS notwithstanding its Swedish origin - I imagine Denmark would still have been the more prosperous part of the kingdom, and the whole premise of UKS as an Atlantic power seems to me to imply prominent Danish interests in such a kingdom.”

Denmark and England were on friendly terms until Christian IV due to financial woes decided to hike the Øresund toll far behind its customary level. This created a fundamental distrust to Denmark in England and the Netherlands, which lay behind their agreement with France to keep the Treaty of Roskilde (which ceeded Eastern Denmark and Bohuslen to Sweden) as the baseline for Nordic borders, with no country having control over both sides of Øresund. A united Scandinavia would have had control over both sides of the sound and be highly tempted to hike up the “entrance fee” to the Baltic Sea, or even to keep English merchants out of the Baltic Sea entirely as undesirable rivals and letting all Baltic trade with England go via Gothenburg. I imagine there would be a “Baltic lobby” in the Commons of MPs from the eastern seaports with a tradition for trading in the Baltics, and the influence of such a lobby is one of the aspects I am interested in.
My argument about relocating the bulk of the navy to the Atlantic coast is simply that this would have been in accordance with the basic logic of power projection and prestige that guided absolutist or “near absolutist” states. Most states in this era sought to maximize their military because it was a measurement of royal prowess and status, unless there was a strong institution with anti-tax sentiments (such as the Commons or the aristocratic Council of the Realm in Denmark) to counter this. The UKS would not have had such a counterweight. The whole rationale behind the Second Northern War (1655-60) was smply that Sweden had assembled a 100,000 strong mercenary army, which it couldn't possibly feed at home. The question then became “should we go against Poland, or Denmark?”. They chose Poland at first, but got bogged down and when Denmark tried a preemptive strike they (nearly) conquered it. The idea of keeping your military on anything less than maximum strength was alien to the Swedish kings and their councillors.
Given that UKS would only have needed a very small naval force in the Baltic Sea to counter piracy and deter Poland from recreating their navy, I think it would logically have deployed the bulk of its naval forces along the Atlantic seaboard and tried to keep them as strong as possible; following the maximalist logic of the Swedish and other non-feudal states at the time (the English parliament being a “feudal relict” in this context, as absolutism was the modern state model).

AS: “At least I imagine a UKS might have been less of a satellite of France and more of a force in its own right, and I can imagine important trade networks building up between it, the United Provinces and Great Britain.”

There would no doubt have been basis for a significant North Sea trade, but I think UKS would have wanted to keep the Baltic Sea as a closed Mare Nostrum with no direct access for English and Dutch merchants. In this case conflict would have been inevitable.
IRL the English/British support of Sweden in “the long18th century” (which existed even during the final phase of the Great Nordic War, where the two countries were at war, but Britain nevertheless played a key role in preventing a Swedish collapse), was a bulwark against Russian expansion westwards. This interest might have led to more cordial relations (and perhaps even an alliance) after the rise of Peter the Great, but not in the latter half of the 17th century where I think the temptation to either monopolize the Baltic trade, or at least demand very high tolls from outsiders would have been too great. UKS would have had a relatively small population and commercial base and needed a strong ally (not least for war subsidies against Russia) and I see a continuation of the French-Swedish alliance as both the most natural and beneficial for the UKS (as France had no Baltic interests), but I agree it wouldn't have been a French client. Given that the Great Nordic War wouldn't have taken place (or at least not in the same way) in this scenario, it isn't certain that Prussia develops into a great power, and this may also influence things. Hannover could potentially have become a more important state (or a burden Britain would have tried to distance itself from with parliament taking a tougher stance on using British resources for Hannoveranian interests). Quite possibly both.

AS: “If UKS remains in the French camp then presumably France comes out of the Anglo-French rivalry better, especially in naval terms, probably keeping Canada and Louisiana; I wonder if the Dutch might have done better in North America too, with Britain perhaps having to concede ground to the Dutch in order to secure alliance against the French and Scandinavians?”

That sounds plausible. New Sweden was conquered by the Dutch in 1655, and in this scenario there UKS would likely have conquered it back (as the Dutch are on the losing side in the Second Northern War in this scenario, with their naval intervention being a failure). An outright attempt to conquer New Netherland would not be out of the question.
I could also imagine UKS could have tried to poach Dutch colonies in the Caribbean, as they would have been seen as a (comparatively) soft target. The Danish West India Guinea Company annexed the uninhabited islands of St. Thomas (1672) and St. John (1675) and a stronger West Indian company may have tried to poach Spanish or Dutch colonies. Maybe even Puerto Rico. A British-Dutch alliance (or at least understanding) would seem logical, but far from uncomplicated. given their fierce commercia rivalry.

“I'm not sure about your suggestion that Britain would have had to divert more resources to the Navy; given the resistance of the British Parliament to taxation to pay for armed forces (which was after all what most taxes went on at the time) I suspect that Britain would have just had to accept that she could not control the seas single-handedly, and look to make alliances to counter-act rivals.”

This is a good point. As you mentioned a British-Dutch alliance may have become a necessity despite none of the parties being all too keen on it. Though this depends on the strength of the Baltic lobby and other trading interests threatened by a less ambitious naval strategy. Perhaps there would have been more of a cleavage between agricultural and trading interests with the matter being more divisive than IRL. Given the small number of significant naval powers this alliance strategy might have been tricky. You only have five first rate naval powers in this scenario (England, France, UKS, the Dutch Republic and Spain (Portugal is de facto 2nd tier and occupied elsewhere with their resouces spread thin). The 2nd and 3rd Anglo-Dutch wars may have been a “luxury” England couldn't afford in this scenario (and they were quite fundamental for changing the balance of power between the two nations). But apart from that Spain is the only other (and unlikely) option.

I will wait to see if anyone have further input, and then perhaps try to access likely implications for the1660-1700 time frame.

[Deleted]

Dec 16, 2016 15:55:34 GMT @sp said:

Though I would point out that with no navy it's hard seeing new Amsterdam becoming New York or anyone other than the french taking both upper and lower Canada. I think the Dutch would have replaced us if honest and fought it out with France over North America. Though I don't see their army defeating the french army on Europe.

No navy no Gibralter and so no treaty on Florida.

No navy is not a realistic scenario, it would have been comparatively weaker, but England/Britain would still have been a first tier naval power.

[Deleted]

The Dutch would have left the Windies alone and expanded in the Cape area

[Toylyyev]

I am currently pondering on modern day effects from the Frankish Confederation, it makes me appreciate how time intensive finding answers to such questions is.

Dec 28, 2016 20:42:11 GMT @sp said:

would having a dominant Netherlands help or hinder a unification of the German States in the 19th century

There does not seem to be anything in the above that would affect the timeline of the French Revolution, leaving the question how a more advanced Netherlands would have reacted.

The Dutch Patriot Revolt might have taken a more political turn, as the downturn caused by the Fourth Anglo-Dutch War would not have occured.

And the Dutch seem to have become involved in the Flanders campaign at the UK's behest to a signifcant degree.

I don't really know enough to conjecture from here if they would have joined in the anti-French coalition at all. And if their additional military capability would have made a difference, but i suspect not. If the French still win there should be repercussions in the Dutch colonies, but how would an advanced society react to French occupation?

It seems this would have to be sorted out before thinking of a scenario for 19th century Germany.

[Adam in Stroud]

Sorry for not responding, @odo, I've been under the influence of cold medication and alcohol for several days so making less sense than usual.

Not sure I can add much, due to sheer ignorance.  However, the UKS as you describe it sounds rather a nightmare.  Every truly succesful empire that I can think of - Rome, the Achaemenids, the British Raj, etc - was based on co-opting local elites.  Charles' UKS seems to be based on the exact opposite principle - alienate the Danish elite by sending them into exile in Pomerania, alienate the Pomeranian elite by dispossessing them utterly, drive a wedge between the Pomeranian peasantry and their landlords by creating an ethnic and linguistic divide, create a similar divide between the Danish peasantry and their new landlords...

It sounds like a recipe for conflict and a drain of resources.  Additionally, the stress on a highly centralised and bureaucratic state would concern me too if I were the Chancellor to the UKS.  That was very much the Louis XIV model at that time, and I imagine there was a conscious influence; but in practice, the much more oligarchic and decentralised Restoration British state outperformed the French monarchy in precisely this era, despite France's larger population, army and so on, and despite Britain having been very much a 2nd rate power in the previous century.  Compare the French Royal Academie des Sciences - government controlled and financed from the start - with the British Royal Society, which got Charles II as patron and the use of "Royal" in its name but not a penny from the state; yet on the whole the Royal Society with Newton, Boyle and Wren outperformed French science in this period. British colonisation of India was based on decentralisation too, with the government owning shares but the East India Company financing and running things - and of course pretty much running its own fleet in the form of heavily armed East Indiamen. 

Overall I'm not convinced that it would have mounted a successful challenge to Britain in the North Atlantic, especially if the UKS turned its ambitions (and its powerful land army) towards Germany and/or Poland, dissipating its resources in that direction.

[carlton43]

For any sort of 'What If' scenario this is far too loose and diffuse even to try to engage with.

[Deleted]

Dec 30, 2016 23:07:08 GMT carlton43 said:

For any sort of 'What If' scenario this is far too loose and diffuse even to try to engage with.

Then don't.

[carlton43]

Dec 30, 2016 23:38:48 GMT @odo said:

Dec 30, 2016 23:07:08 GMT carlton43 said:

For any sort of 'What If' scenario this is far too loose and diffuse even to try to engage with.

Then don't.

It was not meant as any sort of criticism Odo but an explanation of non-engagement. Note the small number of quite long responses in just a single page of responses. 

[Toylyyev]

I had been thinking about the Appeal War in East Frisia

[Deleted]

Dec 30, 2016 22:43:59 GMT Adam in Stroud said:

Overall I'm not convinced that it would have mounted a successful challenge to Britain in the North Atlantic, especially if the UKS turned its ambitions (and its powerful land army) towards Germany and/or Poland, dissipating its resources in that direction.

I see it more as a spoiler than a challenger. The Nordic navy binds significant British resources and this alters the balance of power (possibly forcing a very uneasy British/Dutch alliance). 

Regarding land forces UKS may well be less involved in German affairs than Sweden was IRL. The Danish/Swedish rivalry was the main factor in getting both countries dragged into German politics. Poland was already a country of limited military capacity and the temptation to solely focus on keeping them away from the Baltic coast would have been high with a (potentially very lucrative) overseas alternative. Before the rise of Peter the Great there is room for overseas expansion (or serious attempts at it). The whole premise of my argument is that relatively small changes in the naval power balance would have had a significant effect. If you change the position of Britain from dominance to mere primus inter pares in the 18th century that alters quite a lot, or even if you just delay the point at which Britain gains naval supremacy. 

I will return to this at some time when I have better time and have done a bit more research and try looking deeper into the 1660-1700 time frame decade by decade. I just wanted to see other inputs first. Though this may not be for several months. 

[slon]

Not sure of my facts or their relevance .... hey but that has never stopped me before.

Are you missing the economic angle?
The power of a nation, including military power, is based on the economic success or otherwise. A rich populous nation can afford a big military budget.

The agricultural revolution in England was about a centaury ahead of that in Sweden and Denmark. The growth of Britain as the superpower coincided with the economic progress from 1600 to 1800 before widespread world trade got going.
Agricultural output grew faster than the population over the century to 1770, and thereafter productivity remained among the highest in the world. This increase in the food supply contributed to the rapid growth of population in England and Wales, from 5.5 million in 1700 to over 9 million by 1801 (after that we started importing food and the increase was accelerated).
Agricultural improvements and population growth did not get going in Sweden until about 1800 due to the then feudal system and the obvious climatic problems.
Small changes in the naval power balance due to a building program by Sweden in the 1600s would have had zero overall effect.

[Deleted]

Jan 1, 2017 2:23:40 GMT @sp said:

The Poles were an effective navy famously defeating the Sweedes at sea and taking a number of their prized assets.

Not by this point (the Battle of Oliwa is back in 1627). Their fleet was entirely destroyed by Denmark in 1637 and never really rebuild. They sold off their remaining ships 1641-43. The Duchy of Courland had its own navy, but post-1660 not on a scale where it matters in this context (it would have been easily destroyed). 

[Deleted]

Jan 4, 2017 11:51:07 GMT slon said:

Not sure of my facts or their relevance .... hey but that has never stopped me before.

The sign of a modern politician