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Post by iainbhx on Sept 4, 2022 16:40:39 GMT
I think the means matters to several of your other questions. Also, the big question is how long is a big war delayed for?
There is not really a route for the survival of the Austro-Hungarian empire, things would get very sticky in 1916 after the death of Franz Joseph and no war doesn't mean he'd live much longer due to less stress. Franz Ferdinand was not a fan of the current Ausgleich between Austria and Hungary and there were issues on both sides of the settlement.
There is probably going to be more nibbling at the Ottomans, although the Third Balkan war may not involve them, although they may decided to get involved anyway. The longer they stay out, the more chance of survival - the many ethnic questions of the Empire will be problematic to them, but may be useful to the British who need white settlers in Australia and Southern Africa. Loads of Pontic Greeks, Armenians etc. There will eventually be problems over oil in the usual places. However, the later they are, the longer the Young Turks have to make reforms and the Empire may not be the sick man of Europe.
A non-Bolshevik Russia is possible without the war, there is no great reason for Russia to have more than the odd tumult and pogrom. You won't see the fast industrialisation of Lenin and Stalin, but you will see a fair amount of progress.
Fascism, possibly, somewhere, maybe even a frustrated and truncated Italy which will still have designs on Trent, Trieste, Istria and much of Dalmatia. Maybe Spain. Probably not Germany. Germany will continue to have Anti-Semitic and Völkisch parties, they will be a fringe annoyance. The big German question will be its economic and naval competition with the UK, trying to deal with whatever happens in Austria-Hungary and keeping the SPD out of government - the latter is relatively simple - just don't change the boundaries.
Anything much beyond the early 20's isn't very predictable due to the butterfly effect, especially without the mass deaths of WWI, so many young men with promising careers who might start to change things significantly in the later 1920's.
Jewish emigration to Israel will continue on a small scale and increase after any major pogrom. It won't be the most favoured destination.
Obviously slower developments: Aircraft, cars and vehicles, women's rights etc.
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islington
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Post by islington on Sept 4, 2022 19:55:56 GMT
My initial reaction is that this would be hugely to the advantage of Germany, which was rapidly industrializing and would have soon surpassed the UK in terms of its economic muscle if indeed it had not already done so by 1914. With Austria-Hungary already well in hand (from the German point of view), an effective working accommodation with Turkey, and with Alsace-Lorraine of course retained, Germany was well on the way to becoming a European hegemon and I can't see what would have derailed this process except, of course, for a major war.
It is ironic that the power that had more to lose than any other from the outbreak of a major war was also the power that did more than any other to bring it about.
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Post by Daft H'a'porth A'peth A'pith on Sept 4, 2022 21:15:30 GMT
No WW1 means no WW2, it means Britain, France and Germany are not bankrupted by war, meaning the US does not become the dominant economic powerhouse it is in the world today. That's a big change to human history.
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Post by 🏴☠️ Neath West 🏴☠️ on Sept 5, 2022 9:40:37 GMT
The problem was that Germany and France were led by utter buffoons at the time. The French President Raymond Poincaré being in St Petersburg inciting Russian mobilization (to the horror of his own ambassador) at the time of the Austro-Hungarian ultimatum really did not help anything. And then the German Chancellor Theobald von Bethmann Hollweg behaved in a completely dog-in-the-manger way, seemingly trying at every turn not to present a common position with Britain, whether it was that the Serbian response to the ultimatum was satisfactory, or that the Austrian army should stop in Belgrade, despite those effectively being things that Germany and Britain agreed upon.
Maybe the best way to avoid WW1 would have been for Jules Pams somehow to win the 1913 French presidential election...
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myth11
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Post by myth11 on Sept 5, 2022 10:11:03 GMT
My initial reaction is that this would be hugely to the advantage of Germany, which was rapidly industrializing and would have soon surpassed the UK in terms of its economic muscle if indeed it had not already done so by 1914. With Austria-Hungary already well in hand (from the German point of view), an effective working accommodation with Turkey, and with Alsace-Lorraine of course retained, Germany was well on the way to becoming a European hegemon and I can't see what would have derailed this process except, of course, for a major war. It is ironic that the power that had more to lose than any other from the outbreak of a major war was also the power that did more than any other to bring it about. In terms manufacturing the UK was in slow decline with the war killing exports but were still the king of overseas capital which got spent on funding the war. Germany prewar was one of the biggest buyers of south Wales Anthracite coal. The war itself speeded up the change from coal to oil as main source of fuel used in shipping. |
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Post by finsobruce on Sept 5, 2022 10:11:17 GMT
The problem was that Germany and France were led by utter buffoons at the time. The French President Raymond Poincaré being in St Petersburg inciting Russian mobilization (to the horror of his own ambassador) at the time of the Austro-Hungarian ultimatum really did not help anything. And then the German Chancellor Theobald von Bethmann Hollweg behaved in a completely dog-in-the-manger way, seemingly trying at every turn not to present a common position with Britain, whether it was that the Serbian response to the ultimatum was satisfactory, or that the Austrian army should stop in Belgrade, despite those effectively being things that Germany and Britain agreed upon. Maybe the best way to avoid WW1 would have been for Jules Pams somehow to win the 1913 French presidential election... Jules! Did he run with Sandy?  |
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J.G.Harston
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Post by J.G.Harston on Sept 5, 2022 10:14:59 GMT
The problem was that Germany and France were led by utter buffoons at the time. The French President Raymond Poincaré being in St Petersburg inciting Russian mobilization (to the horror of his own ambassador) at the time of the Austro-Hungarian ultimatum really did not help anything. And then the German Chancellor Theobald von Bethmann Hollweg behaved in a completely dog-in-the-manger way, seemingly trying at every turn not to present a common position with Britain, whether it was that the Serbian response to the ultimatum was satisfactory, or that the Austrian army should stop in Belgrade, despite those effectively being things that Germany and Britain agreed upon. Maybe the best way to avoid WW1 would have been for Jules Pams somehow to win the 1913 French presidential election... Jules! Did he run with Sandy? A bona question. |
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slon
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Post by slon on Sept 5, 2022 10:25:44 GMT
My initial reaction is that this would be hugely to the advantage of Germany, which was rapidly industrializing and would have soon surpassed the UK in terms of its economic muscle if indeed it had not already done so by 1914. With Austria-Hungary already well in hand (from the German point of view), an effective working accommodation with Turkey, and with Alsace-Lorraine of course retained, Germany was well on the way to becoming a European hegemon and I can't see what would have derailed this process except, of course, for a major war. It is ironic that the power that had more to lose than any other from the outbreak of a major war was also the power that did more than any other to bring it about. Except for the Entente Cordiale ... with the twin aims of hoovering up all the loose bits of the disintegrating empires, and finding ways to balkanise Germany. |
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islington
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Post by islington on Sept 5, 2022 10:38:27 GMT
My initial reaction is that this would be hugely to the advantage of Germany, which was rapidly industrializing and would have soon surpassed the UK in terms of its economic muscle if indeed it had not already done so by 1914. With Austria-Hungary already well in hand (from the German point of view), an effective working accommodation with Turkey, and with Alsace-Lorraine of course retained, Germany was well on the way to becoming a European hegemon and I can't see what would have derailed this process except, of course, for a major war. It is ironic that the power that had more to lose than any other from the outbreak of a major war was also the power that did more than any other to bring it about. Except for the Entente Cordiale ... with the twin aims of hoovering up all the loose bits of the disintegrating empires, and finding ways to balkanise Germany. I disagree.
German diplomacy before WW1 was aggressive, clumsy, and unpredictable, a fatal combination for one of the greatest powers in Europe. It followed no consistent plan and had no clear aim, making it impossible for other powers to respond sensibly.
The natural flow of events was so much in Germany's favour prior to WW1 that all they really had to do was nothing: not rock the boat or throw their weight about, keep A-H on a tight rein and not let them do anything silly (as opposed to egging them on), cultivate better relations especially with France (since Germany already had all she could reasonably expect from France by 1914), and do everything possible to avoid the one and only thing that might derail Germany's growing European hegemony, namely a major war.
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Post by finsobruce on Sept 5, 2022 10:52:29 GMT
Jules! Did he run with Sandy? A bona question. We have a spring offensive that takes up most of our time! |
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Post by iainbhx on Sept 5, 2022 11:11:18 GMT
Except for the Entente Cordiale ... with the twin aims of hoovering up all the loose bits of the disintegrating empires, and finding ways to balkanise Germany. I disagree. German diplomacy before WW1 was aggressive, clumsy, and unpredictable, a fatal combination for one of the greatest powers in Europe. It followed no consistent plan and had no clear aim, making it impossible for other powers to respond sensibly. The natural flow of events was so much in Germany's favour prior to WW1 that all they really had to do was nothing: not rock the boat or throw their weight about, keep A-H on a tight rein and not let them do anything silly (as opposed to egging them on), cultivate better relations especially with France (since Germany already had all she could reasonably expect from France by 1914), and do everything possible to avoid the one and only thing that might derail Germany's growing European hegemony, namely a major war.
Bethmann-Hollweg's Septemberprogramm had clearly not been to Wednesbury. |
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islington
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Post by islington on Sept 5, 2022 11:20:40 GMT
I disagree. German diplomacy before WW1 was aggressive, clumsy, and unpredictable, a fatal combination for one of the greatest powers in Europe. It followed no consistent plan and had no clear aim, making it impossible for other powers to respond sensibly. The natural flow of events was so much in Germany's favour prior to WW1 that all they really had to do was nothing: not rock the boat or throw their weight about, keep A-H on a tight rein and not let them do anything silly (as opposed to egging them on), cultivate better relations especially with France (since Germany already had all she could reasonably expect from France by 1914), and do everything possible to avoid the one and only thing that might derail Germany's growing European hegemony, namely a major war.
Bethmann-Hollweg's Septemberprogramm had clearly not been to Wednesbury. And critically it was the Septemberprogramm, the war having started at the beginning of August: in other words, it was a post facto rationalization of what they might expect to gain from a war they had blundered into with no clear aim.
"Mein Gott! We've started a war! What are we trying to get from it? Er ... (scribbles furiously) Will this do?"
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Post by 🏴☠️ Neath West 🏴☠️ on Sept 5, 2022 11:42:28 GMT
Except for the Entente Cordiale ... with the twin aims of hoovering up all the loose bits of the disintegrating empires, and finding ways to balkanise Germany. I disagree.
German diplomacy before WW1 was aggressive, clumsy, and unpredictable, a fatal combination for one of the greatest powers in Europe. It followed no consistent plan and had no clear aim, making it impossible for other powers to respond sensibly.
The natural flow of events was so much in Germany's favour prior to WW1 that all they really had to do was nothing: not rock the boat or throw their weight about, keep A-H on a tight rein and not let them do anything silly (as opposed to egging them on), cultivate better relations especially with France (since Germany already had all she could reasonably expect from France by 1914), and do everything possible to avoid the one and only thing that might derail Germany's growing European hegemony, namely a major war.
An interesting version of the what-if is that the Kaiser was reportedly furious with Bethmann-Hollweg for his diplomatic mess when he returned from his North Sea cruise in late July 1914. What if the Kaiser had sacked Bethmann-Hollweg (or accepted his resignation, which was supposedly offered)? |
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Post by iainbhx on Sept 5, 2022 13:26:06 GMT
Bethmann-Hollweg's Septemberprogramm had clearly not been to Wednesbury. And critically it was the Septemberprogramm, the war having started at the beginning of August: in other words, it was a post facto rationalization of what they might expect to gain from a war they had blundered into with no clear aim. "Mein Gott! We've started a war! What are we trying to get from it? Er ... (scribbles furiously) Will this do?"
I think some parts of it had been on the cards for a long while. Luxembourg into the Empire, reducing Belgium (and maybe the Netherlands) to a puppet and the Mittelafrika thing. Some of the rest of it was clearly made up on the hoof, especially in the East. |
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islington
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Post by islington on Sept 5, 2022 13:37:16 GMT
And critically it was the Septemberprogramm, the war having started at the beginning of August: in other words, it was a post facto rationalization of what they might expect to gain from a war they had blundered into with no clear aim. "Mein Gott! We've started a war! What are we trying to get from it? Er ... (scribbles furiously) Will this do?"
I think some parts of it had been on the cards for a long while. Luxembourg into the Empire, reducing Belgium (and maybe the Netherlands) to a puppet and the Mittelafrika thing. Some of the rest of it was clearly made up on the hoof, especially in the East. Yes, and these were perfectly logical things for Germany to pursue diplomatically and through the exploitation of economic strength (e.g. offering custom-free zones on favourable terms). They could probably have been achieved, peacefully, on a 10 to 20 year timescale. But they weren't worth the risk of a major war. |
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slon
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Post by slon on Sept 5, 2022 13:42:28 GMT
Except for the Entente Cordiale ... with the twin aims of hoovering up all the loose bits of the disintegrating empires, and finding ways to balkanise Germany. I disagree.
German diplomacy before WW1 was aggressive, clumsy, and unpredictable, a fatal combination for one of the greatest powers in Europe. It followed no consistent plan and had no clear aim, making it impossible for other powers to respond sensibly.
The natural flow of events was so much in Germany's favour prior to WW1 that all they really had to do was nothing: not rock the boat or throw their weight about, keep A-H on a tight rein and not let them do anything silly (as opposed to egging them on), cultivate better relations especially with France (since Germany already had all she could reasonably expect from France by 1914), and do everything possible to avoid the one and only thing that might derail Germany's growing European hegemony, namely a major war.
You have to remember the fragile nature of Germany as a country at that time. It was not unified but more a group of more or less independent states sharing a language but very little else. The actions of Bismarck to bring the the parts together was not universally popular especially in Bavaria, Alsace and the Hansiatic regions. Sitting still and doing nothing could well have resulted in the disintegration of Germany itself |
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Post by iainbhx on Sept 6, 2022 4:54:06 GMT
I disagree. German diplomacy before WW1 was aggressive, clumsy, and unpredictable, a fatal combination for one of the greatest powers in Europe. It followed no consistent plan and had no clear aim, making it impossible for other powers to respond sensibly. The natural flow of events was so much in Germany's favour prior to WW1 that all they really had to do was nothing: not rock the boat or throw their weight about, keep A-H on a tight rein and not let them do anything silly (as opposed to egging them on), cultivate better relations especially with France (since Germany already had all she could reasonably expect from France by 1914), and do everything possible to avoid the one and only thing that might derail Germany's growing European hegemony, namely a major war.
You have to remember the fragile nature of Germany as a country at that time. It was not unified but more a group of more or less independent states sharing a language but very little else. The actions of Bismarck to bring the the parts together was not universally popular especially in Bavaria, Alsace and the Hansiatic regions. Sitting still and doing nothing could well have resulted in the disintegration of Germany itself Err, no. Completely the wrong end of the stick here. There was and had been an acceptance of a "Germany" for many centuries, it was just the format of that Germany and what it included which was the difficulty. The argument was about Prussian supremacy, which they had achieved mainly by military means, the German empire is basically the Prussian Empire with some smaller regional differences. Which of course is why Austria was not part of Germany, the vast majority of them would consider themselves Germans, but they were too large a unit as Austria-Hungary to be in the German Empire. In a 1917 Ausgleich gone bad situation, you probably have Austria and at least temporarily Bohemia joining the German Empire. United by a language is amusing, only really by a written language at that time. Most people would have spoken their local dialect which would be difficult for others to understand. |
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slon
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Post by slon on Sept 6, 2022 12:43:52 GMT
You have to remember the fragile nature of Germany as a country at that time. It was not unified but more a group of more or less independent states sharing a language but very little else. The actions of Bismarck to bring the the parts together was not universally popular especially in Bavaria, Alsace and the Hansiatic regions. Sitting still and doing nothing could well have resulted in the disintegration of Germany itself Err, no. Completely the wrong end of the stick here. There was and had been an acceptance of a "Germany" for many centuries, it was just the format of that Germany and what it included which was the difficulty. The argument was about Prussian supremacy, which they had achieved mainly by military means, the German empire is basically the Prussian Empire with some smaller regional differences. Which of course is why Austria was not part of Germany, the vast majority of them would consider themselves Germans, but they were too large a unit as Austria-Hungary to be in the German Empire. In a 1917 Ausgleich gone bad situation, you probably have Austria and at least temporarily Bohemia joining the German Empire. United by a language is amusing, only really by a written language at that time. Most people would have spoken their local dialect which would be difficult for others to understand. There are several sticks ..... Germany at the time was not unified, in fact WW1 caused that unification to take place.
There is no single cause of WW1, all the major powers were ramping up the pressure, and the populations were eager for a war to happen. Possibly the most crucial part of the mess was caused in Russia, They had mobilised their army only to stand it down again multiple times, when they mobilised again in 1914 they had to do something.
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Post by iainbhx on Sept 6, 2022 13:47:51 GMT
Germany became real and not just a concept after Königgratz and it was effectively completed after Sedan. It was just a matter to time for Austria-Hungary to fall apart and for Austria proper and the Bohemian mess to fall into the Prussian empire. Fortunately in a number of ways people were too impatient and we ended up with WWI.
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slon
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Post by slon on Sept 7, 2022 8:31:21 GMT
Germany became real and not just a concept after Königgratz and it was effectively completed after Sedan. It was just a matter to time for Austria-Hungary to fall apart and for Austria proper and the Bohemian mess to fall into the Prussian empire. Fortunately in a number of ways people were too impatient and we ended up with WWI. I think you just have to look at the German political map in 1866 to see just how wrong that is. What happened was that almost everyone was bullied into the new Prussian empire, an empire built on very little and which could fall apart very easily |
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