Replacing or updating the FTPA

[islington]

Dec 4, 2020 20:45:57 GMT greenchristian said:

Dec 4, 2020 20:27:35 GMT islington said:

Well, only inasmuch as he's the incumbent.

The logic is more that governments of whatever stripe need some means of upholding party discipline.

Which is what party disciplinary systems and the whip's office are for. Using the power to call general elections as a means of upholding party discipline is, in my view, an abuse of that power. If the government needs more disciplinary powers, then give them extra disciplinary powers, don't give them a non-disciplinary power that can arguably be used as a disciplinary threat. A government using a GE to quell internal party dissent has just as much potential to backfire on them as we've seen with David Cameron's attempt to use a referendum to achieve the same end.

This may be an unpopular view, but I think this is good for democracy because it means that as an ordinary elector I can cast my vote for a candidate with reasonable confidence that he or she will give general support to his or her party, especially if it's in government.

If I wanted an MP who will go off ploughing whichever furrow takes his or her fancy, I'd vote for an independent candidate. But I don't do that, and neither do most other voters. Instead we vote for candidates with a party affiliation, essentially because the party label offers some kind of predictability about how they will behave if elected. We're voting for a party label, not for the individual.

Having said all that, I'm not so worried about the occasional rebellion involving relatively small numbers who are particularly unhappy about some one-off issue. But I'm deeply concerned about the current trend towards larger, more organized semi-permanent groupings of serial rebels, seeking to take collective decisions about how to vote - a party within a party.

Will abolishing the FTPA weaken these groupings by encouraging their members to give their allegiance first and foremost to the party they were elected to support?

I don't know, but I hope so.   

That suggests that you would much prefer a presidential system (where the government is essentially an elected dictator) than a parliamentary one (where government is supposed to be subordinate to the collective judgement of MPs). The current system is not designed to accommodate the electorate voting for the party, rather than their local candidate, so your preference here is pretty much opposed to the entire system.

Also, I don't see that this will undermine the trend for pressure groups within a Parliamentary party to become serial rebels and parties-within-parties. The ERG proved that this strategy works quite effectively, and such pressure groups are unlikely to be as threatened by the prospect of a GE as the government is. At most it raises the stakes for intra-party disputes, but it doesn't put the genie back in the bottle.

I think a presidential system can be much more benign than your characterization suggests; but since I don't favour such a system, even a benign one, we can leave that debate for another day.

Where I'm really struggling is with the description of a parliamentary system as one "where government is supposed to be subordinate to the collective judgement of MPs". If all you mean by this is that MPs have the last-resort power to force the government either to resign or to go to the country, then fine: I agree, and this is the system I favour.

But the word 'subordinate' makes it sound as if you think MPs collectively should set policy and that the role of government is merely to implement their decisions - in other words, that government is no more than the Executive Committee of the House of Commons.

If that's what you meant, then I disagree. The government is a separate branch to the legislature, and it should set its own policy in accordance with its understanding of the national interest. If the majority of the legislature feels that the course on which the government is set is wrong, the remedy is to express no confidence so that the government must either resign or call a GE. This is why the FTPA is so harmful; it prevents government from declaring that a particular vote will be treated as one of confidence, and it places a serious obstacle in the way of calling a GE to resolve a parliamentary impasse.

Allowing the HoC to dictate policy means that it is within the power of the House to compel a government to follow a policy that the government believes is contrary to the national interest. That can't be right.

Regarding your final comment to the effect that repealing the FTPA won't succeed in putting the genie of party factionalism back into its bottle: you may well be right. I have an uncomfortable feeling that you probably are. But I still think it's important to try.

Edited to add: Yes, I agree in theory we vote for individuals in elections. But in practice, the party affiliation weighs far more with most electors than the attributes of the individual candidate, so I stick to my view that MPs are elected to support a particular party and that is what they should normally do. MPs who take a different view of their role, regarding themselves as free agents able to follow their own political path as they see fit, usually get punished for it at the next election (as powerfully demonstrated in 2019).

[Khunanup]

Dec 5, 2020 15:44:18 GMT islington said:

Dec 4, 2020 20:45:57 GMT greenchristian said:

Which is what party disciplinary systems and the whip's office are for. Using the power to call general elections as a means of upholding party discipline is, in my view, an abuse of that power. If the government needs more disciplinary powers, then give them extra disciplinary powers, don't give them a non-disciplinary power that can arguably be used as a disciplinary threat. A government using a GE to quell internal party dissent has just as much potential to backfire on them as we've seen with David Cameron's attempt to use a referendum to achieve the same end.

That suggests that you would much prefer a presidential system (where the government is essentially an elected dictator) than a parliamentary one (where government is supposed to be subordinate to the collective judgement of MPs). The current system is not designed to accommodate the electorate voting for the party, rather than their local candidate, so your preference here is pretty much opposed to the entire system.

Also, I don't see that this will undermine the trend for pressure groups within a Parliamentary party to become serial rebels and parties-within-parties. The ERG proved that this strategy works quite effectively, and such pressure groups are unlikely to be as threatened by the prospect of a GE as the government is. At most it raises the stakes for intra-party disputes, but it doesn't put the genie back in the bottle.

I think a presidential system can be much more benign than your characterization suggests; but since I don't favour such a system, even a benign one, we can leave that debate for another day.

Where I'm really struggling is with the description of a parliamentary system as one "where government is supposed to be subordinate to the collective judgement of MPs". If all you mean by this is that MPs have the last-resort power to force the government either to resign or to go to the country, then fine: I agree, and this is the system I favour.

But the word 'subordinate' makes it sound as if you think MPs collectively should set policy and that the role of government is merely to implement their decisions - in other words, that government is no more than the Executive Committee of the House of Commons.

If that's what you meant, then I disagree. The government is a separate branch to the legislature, and it should set its own policy in accordance with its understanding of the national interest. If the majority of the legislature feels that the course on which the government is set is wrong, the remedy is to express no confidence so that the government must either resign or call a GE. This is why the FTPA is so harmful; it prevents government from declaring that a particular vote will be treated as one of confidence, and it places a serious obstacle in the way of calling a GE to resolve a parliamentary impasse.

Allowing the HoC to dictate policy means that it is within the power of the House to compel a government to follow a policy that the government believes is contrary to the national interest. That can't be right.

Regarding your final comment to the effect that repealing the FTPA won't succeed in putting the genie of party factionalism back into its bottle: you may well be right. I have an uncomfortable feeling that you probably are. But I still think it's important to try.

Edited to add: Yes, I agree in theory we vote for individuals in elections. But in practice, the party affiliation weighs far more with most electors than the attributes of the individual candidate, so I stick to my view that MPs are elected to support a particular party and that is what they should normally do. MPs who take a different view of their role, regarding themselves as free agents able to follow their own political path as they see fit, usually get punished for it at the next election (as powerfully demonstrated in 2019).

The bottom line is, do you believe in executive or legislative sovereignty? If the former then the coercive power to bend the legislature to your will and treat it as a whole as a vehicle of convenience is paramount and that's how you should design your parliamentary/presidential system (and retaining at least limited pre-democratic powers of ruling by decree/executive order/prerogative etc.). If the latter then you should design your parliamentary system so that the executive is to be accountable to the legislature at all points, exists only at their sufferance and has no powers other than the legislature deigns to grant them.

The latter is clearly my preference and I personally think the vestiges of absolute monarchy that exist in the former system in democracies round the world shows that the vast majority of countries have got a long way to go to manifest truly representative democracy.

[michael2019]

Dec 5, 2020 15:44:18 GMT islington said:

Dec 4, 2020 20:45:57 GMT greenchristian said:

Which is what party disciplinary systems and the whip's office are for. Using the power to call general elections as a means of upholding party discipline is, in my view, an abuse of that power. If the government needs more disciplinary powers, then give them extra disciplinary powers, don't give them a non-disciplinary power that can arguably be used as a disciplinary threat. A government using a GE to quell internal party dissent has just as much potential to backfire on them as we've seen with David Cameron's attempt to use a referendum to achieve the same end.

That suggests that you would much prefer a presidential system (where the government is essentially an elected dictator) than a parliamentary one (where government is supposed to be subordinate to the collective judgement of MPs). The current system is not designed to accommodate the electorate voting for the party, rather than their local candidate, so your preference here is pretty much opposed to the entire system.

Also, I don't see that this will undermine the trend for pressure groups within a Parliamentary party to become serial rebels and parties-within-parties. The ERG proved that this strategy works quite effectively, and such pressure groups are unlikely to be as threatened by the prospect of a GE as the government is. At most it raises the stakes for intra-party disputes, but it doesn't put the genie back in the bottle.

I think a presidential system can be much more benign than your characterization suggests; but since I don't favour such a system, even a benign one, we can leave that debate for another day.

Where I'm really struggling is with the description of a parliamentary system as one "where government is supposed to be subordinate to the collective judgement of MPs". If all you mean by this is that MPs have the last-resort power to force the government either to resign or to go to the country, then fine: I agree, and this is the system I favour.

But the word 'subordinate' makes it sound as if you think MPs collectively should set policy and that the role of government is merely to implement their decisions - in other words, that government is no more than the Executive Committee of the House of Commons.

If that's what you meant, then I disagree. The government is a separate branch to the legislature, and it should set its own policy in accordance with its understanding of the national interest. If the majority of the legislature feels that the course on which the government is set is wrong, the remedy is to express no confidence so that the government must either resign or call a GE. This is why the FTPA is so harmful; it prevents government from declaring that a particular vote will be treated as one of confidence, and it places a serious obstacle in the way of calling a GE to resolve a parliamentary impasse.

Allowing the HoC to dictate policy means that it is within the power of the House to compel a government to follow a policy that the government believes is contrary to the national interest. That can't be right.

Regarding your final comment to the effect that repealing the FTPA won't succeed in putting the genie of party factionalism back into its bottle: you may well be right. I have an uncomfortable feeling that you probably are. But I still think it's important to try.

Edited to add: Yes, I agree in theory we vote for individuals in elections. But in practice, the party affiliation weighs far more with most electors than the attributes of the individual candidate, so I stick to my view that MPs are elected to support a particular party and that is what they should normally do. MPs who take a different view of their role, regarding themselves as free agents able to follow their own political path as they see fit, usually get punished for it at the next election (as powerfully demonstrated in 2019).

That is exactly right.

The executive is not the legislature and it has to win Parliamentary approval for each action that it wishes to take. For example if memory serves me right Cameron lost a vote on taking military action in Syria. It was compelled to take action (or not do something) by Parliament. Now the Executive can go to war without reference to Parliament through the Royal Prerogative but the convention since Iraq is that it will seek approval from Parliament.

The executive is exactly the Executive Committee of the House of Commons (and Lords).

Now the position is complicated. 

In practice the Executive can do some things on its own through the royal prerogative. (Although theoretically the legislature could legislate to remove that from them).

It also holds a lot of sway in conducting business in the Commons. In practice (although I believe there is technically a vote) it (normally) sets the business of the House. "Money" bills can only be introduced by the Government not backbenchers. And if they have prior authorisation ministers can legislate through secondary legislation and statutory instruments which normally go through on the nod.

So in practice the executive has a lot of power to get things done. But it is doing so as the Executive committee of Parliament and always subject to their approval - even if it is only a nod and in practical terms they have more power to run the business of the House than backbenchers. 

Also our party system gives the executive greater powers. They can say to their MPs that they are members of their party and they got elected on their manifesto and due to the great political cunning of their party leader! Therefore they should support the Executive and they have a mandate from the people to take action. Obviously also MPs also want to get re-elected and by and large that means a member of that political party - as mostly a Conservative is never going to win as a Labour candidate in a Tory seat and vice versa.

We don't obviously elect the Executive directly as we don't have presidential elections. So all power resides in the legislature and they do indeed effective form an executive ("committee") to take on that work.

And of course there is no requirement for their to be political parties in the Commons. And we have seen weaker party systems in the past in the 19th century. And in recent times we have seen MPs jumping ship from their party.

And if you look at the last parliament, both Labour and the Tories were "captured" by leaderships that probably around 2/3rds of their MPs disagreed with. Obviously Corbyn only just scraped the nomination of his own parliamentary party and was foisted upon them by the Labour party's membership. And while they may have supported upholding the result of the referendum on Europe, about 2/3rds of Tory MPs voted remain in the referendum and weren't enthusiastic brexiteers.

We don't have a democracy - we don't all go and vote on each issue as happened in Athens which would be a democracy.

We have an elected dictatorship. 

So it is right in my view that we have mechanisms through pressure on MPs between general elections for the Executive to pay attention to the people.

---

People here have talked about the last Parliament being more rebellious than others. I am not sure that this is the case. During the Thatcher years, 30+ MPs left Labour for the SDP and there was a lot of disquiet among Tories about Thatcher. Major had the Maastricht rebels etc. There was a not an insubstantial rump of people like Corbyn who rebelled against Blair and he had resignations from his Cabinet over Iraq etc.

Obviously rebellions are noticed less when the governing party has a bigger majority as they probably don't actually change the outcome.

Obviously one of two things happen with a rebellion by MPs from a governing party. Either they are going to be more than the majority in which case the Government probably thinks again. Or they are going to be less in which case it probably presses ahead. Obviously it also tries to restrict a rebellion growing.

But often it pays to listen to serious objections. As the key for a Government is not to do too many stupid and unpopular things and get re-elected at the next election.

[mboy]

This is quite an interesting debate, but it seems increasingly apparent to me that the ultimate outcome of this attempt to take the Commons back to the 19th century will be an acceleration of the end of the Monarchy's involvement in politics in any way. I predict we will see both disestablishment and also the end of all Prerogative within 20 years. When Brexit is gone as an issue I think the public generally will realise they have no love at all for someone like Charles to be put in a position of power just so a PM like Boris can have his way.

[Foggy]

MPs being able to follow either their own whims or those of their constituents has always been a feature of our system, not a bug. Sixty years ago we didn't even have party labels on the ballot paper; thirty years ago, I believe we still didn't have party logos.

Anybody advocating for different behaviour by our representatives on the basis that their partisan vote should produce a lobby-fodder robot, but who doesn't want a strongman presidential set-up, is probably looking for a closed-list or winner-take-all system. Or else a stronger culture of MPs sticking closely to the whip, which would take decades to foster.

In three of the four constituencies I've lived in since I could vote, my MPs have always toed the party line. In fact, my current one is a PPS so he couldn't rebel without resigning or being sacked. Eastbourne was the exception. One issue that stretched the local MP's conscience was Brexit, which did admittedly cause a constitutional crisis. The other was Caroline Ansell voting against George Osborne's plans to extend Sunday trading hours in England. I doubt a PM would make the latter a confidence issue to force it through, but just in case I don't think any government should legislate to give themselves and future administrations that option.

Falling back on the Lascelles principles with no legal weight whatsoever is not a satisfactory, modern solution to the problem. Reintroducing a prerogative power just because someone prefers MPs to act like zombies is like using a post maul to crack a pistachio.

[islington]

Dec 5, 2020 16:24:43 GMT Khunanup said:

Dec 5, 2020 15:44:18 GMT islington said:

I think a presidential system can be much more benign than your characterization suggests; but since I don't favour such a system, even a benign one, we can leave that debate for another day.

Where I'm really struggling is with the description of a parliamentary system as one "where government is supposed to be subordinate to the collective judgement of MPs". If all you mean by this is that MPs have the last-resort power to force the government either to resign or to go to the country, then fine: I agree, and this is the system I favour.

But the word 'subordinate' makes it sound as if you think MPs collectively should set policy and that the role of government is merely to implement their decisions - in other words, that government is no more than the Executive Committee of the House of Commons.

If that's what you meant, then I disagree. The government is a separate branch to the legislature, and it should set its own policy in accordance with its understanding of the national interest. If the majority of the legislature feels that the course on which the government is set is wrong, the remedy is to express no confidence so that the government must either resign or call a GE. This is why the FTPA is so harmful; it prevents government from declaring that a particular vote will be treated as one of confidence, and it places a serious obstacle in the way of calling a GE to resolve a parliamentary impasse.

Allowing the HoC to dictate policy means that it is within the power of the House to compel a government to follow a policy that the government believes is contrary to the national interest. That can't be right.

Regarding your final comment to the effect that repealing the FTPA won't succeed in putting the genie of party factionalism back into its bottle: you may well be right. I have an uncomfortable feeling that you probably are. But I still think it's important to try.

Edited to add: Yes, I agree in theory we vote for individuals in elections. But in practice, the party affiliation weighs far more with most electors than the attributes of the individual candidate, so I stick to my view that MPs are elected to support a particular party and that is what they should normally do. MPs who take a different view of their role, regarding themselves as free agents able to follow their own political path as they see fit, usually get punished for it at the next election (as powerfully demonstrated in 2019).

The bottom line is, do you believe in executive or legislative sovereignty? If the former then the coercive power to bend the legislature to your will and treat it as a whole as a vehicle of convenience is paramount and that's how you should design your parliamentary/presidential system (and retaining at least limited pre-democratic powers of ruling by decree/executive order/prerogative etc.). If the latter then you should design your parliamentary system so that the executive is to be accountable to the legislature at all points, exists only at their sufferance and has no powers other than the legislature deigns to grant them.

The latter is clearly my preference and I personally think the vestiges of absolute monarchy that exist in the former system in democracies round the world shows that the vast majority of countries have got a long way to go to manifest truly representative democracy.

Well if that's the bottom line, the answer is: neither.

I believe in popular sovereignty.

The question is what, in practical terms, is the best way of achieving it?

[Khunanup]

Dec 5, 2020 20:31:34 GMT islington said:

Dec 5, 2020 16:24:43 GMT Khunanup said:

The bottom line is, do you believe in executive or legislative sovereignty? If the former then the coercive power to bend the legislature to your will and treat it as a whole as a vehicle of convenience is paramount and that's how you should design your parliamentary/presidential system (and retaining at least limited pre-democratic powers of ruling by decree/executive order/prerogative etc.). If the latter then you should design your parliamentary system so that the executive is to be accountable to the legislature at all points, exists only at their sufferance and has no powers other than the legislature deigns to grant them.

The latter is clearly my preference and I personally think the vestiges of absolute monarchy that exist in the former system in democracies round the world shows that the vast majority of countries have got a long way to go to manifest truly representative democracy.

Well if that's the bottom line, the answer is: neither.

I believe in popular sovereignty.

The question is what, in practical terms, is the best way of achieving it?

You're comparing apples and oranges.

You're talking about the vehicle of national sovereignty, I'm talking about internal governmental sovereignty (ie, which part of government gets to express whatever form of national sovereignty exists).

Of course in this country the basis of our polity is personal sovereignty, not popular sovereignty, with governmental sovereignty delegated to partially democratically elected representatives.

[greenchristian]

Dec 5, 2020 15:44:18 GMT islington said:

Dec 4, 2020 20:45:57 GMT greenchristian said:

Which is what party disciplinary systems and the whip's office are for. Using the power to call general elections as a means of upholding party discipline is, in my view, an abuse of that power. If the government needs more disciplinary powers, then give them extra disciplinary powers, don't give them a non-disciplinary power that can arguably be used as a disciplinary threat. A government using a GE to quell internal party dissent has just as much potential to backfire on them as we've seen with David Cameron's attempt to use a referendum to achieve the same end.

That suggests that you would much prefer a presidential system (where the government is essentially an elected dictator) than a parliamentary one (where government is supposed to be subordinate to the collective judgement of MPs). The current system is not designed to accommodate the electorate voting for the party, rather than their local candidate, so your preference here is pretty much opposed to the entire system.

Also, I don't see that this will undermine the trend for pressure groups within a Parliamentary party to become serial rebels and parties-within-parties. The ERG proved that this strategy works quite effectively, and such pressure groups are unlikely to be as threatened by the prospect of a GE as the government is. At most it raises the stakes for intra-party disputes, but it doesn't put the genie back in the bottle.

I think a presidential system can be much more benign than your characterization suggests; but since I don't favour such a system, even a benign one, we can leave that debate for another day.

Where I'm really struggling is with the description of a parliamentary system as one "where government is supposed to be subordinate to the collective judgement of MPs". If all you mean by this is that MPs have the last-resort power to force the government either to resign or to go to the country, then fine: I agree, and this is the system I favour.

But the word 'subordinate' makes it sound as if you think MPs collectively should set policy and that the role of government is merely to implement their decisions - in other words, that government is no more than the Executive Committee of the House of Commons.

If that's what you meant, then I disagree. The government is a separate branch to the legislature, and it should set its own policy in accordance with its understanding of the national interest. If the majority of the legislature feels that the course on which the government is set is wrong, the remedy is to express no confidence so that the government must either resign or call a GE. This is why the FTPA is so harmful; it prevents government from declaring that a particular vote will be treated as one of confidence, and it places a serious obstacle in the way of calling a GE to resolve a parliamentary impasse.

Allowing the HoC to dictate policy means that it is within the power of the House to compel a government to follow a policy that the government believes is contrary to the national interest. That can't be right.

Under our system the government is not a separate branch to the legislature, and hasn't been since Walpole. If it were, it would not be composed entirely of members of the legislature. Also, I wasn't intending to suggest that a Presidential system is not benign (I maintain that it is possible for dictatorships to be benign as long as they don't last long enough for the power to corrupt). My point was that democratic Presidential systems are designed to make the executive accountable only to the electorate. Parliamentary systems are designed to make the government primarily accountable to Parliament (and, therefore, be accountable throughout their term rather than just once every few years), and that it is Parliament who are accountable to the electorate.

Regarding your final comment to the effect that repealing the FTPA won't succeed in putting the genie of party factionalism back into its bottle: you may well be right. I have an uncomfortable feeling that you probably are. But I still think it's important to try.

The thing that confuses me here is why you think that this is a good way to try. We had plenty of examples of party factionalism long before the FTPA was introduced. It's just that the stresses of recent years (Brexit dominating everything and being an issue where the dividing lines are not party-political, combined with Parliaments without a large majority) have made it more visible. The only thing that has arguably changed in the last few years has been how the factions within the two main parties have organised.

And, to be honest, I think party factionalism is an inevitable part of any political set-up which has two main parties who perpetually dominate everything. To prevent this from being a significant factor in politics it is necessary to have a system where the factions feel it is more viable to organise as a separate party than as a faction within one of the big two. And that is only going to happen under a proportional electoral system.

Edited to add:

Yes, I agree in theory we vote for individuals in elections. But in practice, the party affiliation weighs far more with most electors than the attributes of the individual candidate, so I stick to my view that MPs are elected to support a particular party and that is what they should normally do. MPs who take a different view of their role, regarding themselves as free agents able to follow their own political path as they see fit, usually get punished for it at the next election (as powerfully demonstrated in 2019).

The problem being that parties are barely part of the formal system at all. Our system of government is still based on the notion that the MP is elected to represent their constituency, rather than their area. If we want a system that encourages MPs to stick to their party's line then that goal is best served by a pure party list system - as anything else allows a rebellious MP to say that they represent their constituency first and their party second. Though AMS gets you halfway there (since that justification only applies to a proportion of MPs).

[Foggy]

Dec 5, 2020 20:31:34 GMT islington said:

Dec 5, 2020 16:24:43 GMT Khunanup said:

The bottom line is, do you believe in executive or legislative sovereignty? If the former then the coercive power to bend the legislature to your will and treat it as a whole as a vehicle of convenience is paramount and that's how you should design your parliamentary/presidential system (and retaining at least limited pre-democratic powers of ruling by decree/executive order/prerogative etc.). If the latter then you should design your parliamentary system so that the executive is to be accountable to the legislature at all points, exists only at their sufferance and has no powers other than the legislature deigns to grant them.

The latter is clearly my preference and I personally think the vestiges of absolute monarchy that exist in the former system in democracies round the world shows that the vast majority of countries have got a long way to go to manifest truly representative democracy.

Well if that's the bottom line, the answer is: neither.

I believe in popular sovereignty.

Restoring a part of the royal prerogative, of all things, in order to protect popular sovereignty.

You couldn't make it up... 

[islington]

Dec 5, 2020 21:52:34 GMT Khunanup said:

Dec 5, 2020 20:31:34 GMT islington said:

Well if that's the bottom line, the answer is: neither.

I believe in popular sovereignty.

The question is what, in practical terms, is the best way of achieving it?

You're comparing apples and oranges.

You're talking about the vehicle of national sovereignty, I'm talking about internal governmental sovereignty (ie, which part of government gets to express whatever form of national sovereignty exists).

Of course in this country the basis of our polity is personal sovereignty, not popular sovereignty, with governmental sovereignty delegated to partially democratically elected representatives.

Well, I agree that 'sovereignty' is one of those slippery words that subtly changes its meaning depending on the context.

But I don't agree that 'executive sovereignty' vs 'legislative sovereignty' is a zero-sum game, meaning that we must go all-in on one or the other.

This would mean, if we favour the executive, that governments may do whatever they please, without any check or meaningful constraint, until election time rolls round again.

Or, if we favour the legislature, that the overall direction of public policy emerges in some not-very-well-defined manner from the collective will of MPs, and that the function of government is merely to give it effect whether or not they agree with it. (Question: if you favour this approach, why do we need politically-appointed ministers at all? Surely the civil service could do it.)

What I'm advocating is neither of these extremes but a balance between the legislature and the executive, such that the executive governs the country according to its understanding of the national interest; but the legislature exercises a general oversight, questions ministers, raises issues of public concern, and deliberates on and, if it thinks fit, enacts new laws usually (not always) put forward by the executive.

Thus, it is not a matter of subordinating the executive to the legislature, or vice versa: each is sovereign in its own sphere.

And in the last resort, if the executive and legislature differ on some issue that is of great importance to both, and neither is prepared to compromise or back down, then the legislature has power to refer the matter to the electorate. The mechanism for do this is to defeat the government in a confidence vote.

[Wisconsin]

The joint committee examining the FTPA will be taking oral evidence at 10:45 tomorrow morning.

committees.parliament.uk/committee/491/joint-committee-on-the-fixedterm-parliaments-act/news/136986/joint-committee-on-the-fixed-term-parliaments-takes-evidence-from-professor-alison-young-and-sir-stephen-laws/

[Wisconsin]

The Dissolution and Calling of Parliament Bill was introduced and published today.

The bill (as introduced):
bills.parliament.uk/Publications/41467/Documents/206/21008.pdf

Explanatory notes:
bills.parliament.uk/Publications/41468/Documents/207/21008en.pdf

[Wisconsin]

WMS from Chloe Smith:
questions-statements.parliament.uk/written-statements/detail/2021-05-12/hcws8

And I’d missed it from March - the 100 page report of the joint committee:
committees.parliament.uk/publications/5190/documents/52402/default/

Government response to report (published today):
assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/984482/Government_response_to_the_Joint_Committee_on_the_Fixed-term_Parliaments_Act_Report.pdf

[Wisconsin]

Second reading of the bill provisionally scheduled for Tuesday 6 July.

[Wisconsin]

Second reading took place this afternoon - approved 367-65.

Some good contributions from Chris Bryant. Chloe Smith was back in Parliament and closed the debate.

[Khunanup]

Jul 6, 2021 18:11:08 GMT Wisconsin said:

Second reading took place this afternoon - approved 367-65.

Some good contributions from Chris Bryant. Chloe Smith was back in Parliament and closed the debate.

Another major constitutional issue where Labour were whipped to abstain?

[Harry Hayfield]

Jul 6, 2021 18:11:08 GMT Wisconsin said:

Second reading took place this afternoon - approved 367-65.

Some good contributions from Chris Bryant. Chloe Smith was back in Parliament and closed the debate.

Assuming that all Con MP's voted in favour bar the Deputy Speakers (363) who were the four opposition MP's who voted AYE as well?

[Wisconsin]

Jul 6, 2021 20:00:06 GMT Harry Hayfield said:

Jul 6, 2021 18:11:08 GMT Wisconsin said:

Second reading took place this afternoon - approved 367-65.

Some good contributions from Chris Bryant. Chloe Smith was back in Parliament and closed the debate.

Assuming that all Con MP's voted in favour bar the Deputy Speakers (363) who were the four opposition MP's who voted AYE as well?

358 Tory, 8 DUP, 1 Independent (Khan)
votes.parliament.uk/Votes/Commons/Division/1070?byMember=False

[Davıd Boothroyd]

See votes.parliament.uk/Votes/Commons/Division/1070

Ayes: C 360, UDUP 8, Ind C 1 (Ahmad Khan)
Noes: SNP 45, L Dem 12, PC 3, Alba 2, Ind 2 (Edwards, Ferrier), SDLP 2, APNI 1

[Davıd Boothroyd]

Association of Electoral Administrators calls for overhaul of electoral law: www.aea-elections.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/The-AEAs-Blueprint-for-a-Modern-Electoral-Landscape.pdf

(Can't agree with their recommendation to eliminate assenting electors - they don't seem to have acknowledged the need to prevent frivolous candidates)