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Post by No Offence Alan on Dec 4, 2020 8:19:25 GMT
Shame about not keeping the ones on international aid and rural broadband. Agree on broadband, though I wasn't aware it was breached. As a conservative, I'm against foreign aid unless it either directly benefits us or is the kind of basic inoculations for polio etc. Cutting it by 4bn is small potatoes. I'd have reduced it further. Still, with this bill on the FTPA taking place in the first year of a government, with hundreds dying each day from COVID, at least the Cons will not be able to lecture the Lib Dems any more on prioritising constitutional issues.
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Post by islington on Dec 4, 2020 9:30:18 GMT
Well, I agree that the situation in the last few months of the last Parliament was highly undesirable, and yes, of course the exact issue at stake - when and whether we were to leave the EU and on what terms - was a one-off. But a major factor was the lack of party discipline. MPs have got into the habit of rebelling, far more often and on a larger and more organized scale than in the past, and there's a plausible argument that this results, at least in part, from the fact that with the FTPA in place Government lacks the nuclear option of calling a GE.
It's still going on now. Habits cultivated during the Brexit process are being carried forward to the handling of the pandemic.
If the FTPA is repealed, maybe over time greater discipline will be restored and Government majorities will be more reliable.
And if you believe that well-functioning and reasonably well-disciplined political parties are good for democracy, then there is some comfort to be taken from the fact that of the huge number (I lost count) of MPs in the last Parliament that took rebellion to its logical conclusion and bolted their parties altogether, not a single one survived into the present Parliament.
As for Christy Clark, can you clarify the exact circumstances? My impression is that her party lost its majority in the 2017 election in British Columbia, and that she wanted a further election rather than allow the opposition parties to take over after they had cut some sort of deal giving them a majority.
Is that right?
For me, the question would be whether she had received the confidence of the newly elected house. If she had, say by passing a Queen's Speech (or whatever is the equivalent in BC politics), then I agree that Lascelles means she was entitled to another election. But if she'd never received the confidence of the new house, then no, I don't think she was entitled - especially if there was a potential alternative government likely to command a majority.
Clark had indeed failed to obtain the confidence of the new Assembly and wanted to call an election only 3 months or so after the last one, because the Liberals had enough money in the coffers to fund a second election campaign and she knew the two other main parties didn't. As far as I'm aware, the proposed legislation in this country in would not permit the monarch to refuse a prompt dissolution in such a scenario. If I'm mistaken, could you please point me to the cause that prevents this?It would be tempting for a governing party to make it as easy as that to dissolve the House whenever they like, but they'd soon regret it as soon as another party came to power and would be able to use the same mechanism for their own ends. I think you are underestimating how much partisan MPs rebelled against the whip before 2019, and how much they've gone back to doing so in recent months without governance collapsing. If you want stricter Fraktionszwang, then I don't know what to suggest other than to look to German practices (where early dissolutions are more difficult, but far from impossible) which, while still parliamentary, would constitute quite a break from Westminster traditions. Backbench rebellions do not generally prevent the British system from functioning; the logical extreme of those rebellions, seen in action last year, did indeed make it dysfunctional. I feel that they were a one-off, though, and that this kind of change to the FTPA isn't needed. To answer the question I've put in bold, the Bill restores the royal prerogative. It therefore also restores the prerogative of refusing a dissolution if the PM requests it.
So this throws us back onto Lascelles, which never had any formal or legal force. It was only ever based on a letter to the Times from the Private Secretary of George VI suggesting that a prudent sovereign would normally agree to a dissolution "unless he were satisfied that: (1) the existing Parliament was still vital, viable, and capable of doing its job; (2) a General Election would be detrimental to the national economy; (3) he could rely on finding another Prime Minister who could carry on his Government, for a reasonable period, with a working majority in the House of Commons".
Since 1950, when that letter appeared, the approach it suggests has been the subject of much commentary and possibly some refinement. It has been suggested that the second test, regarding the economy, might not necessarily have the same force as the first and third tests. More fundamentally, it has also been suggested that there is a critical distinction, not found in the Lascelles letter, between a Prime Minister that formerly enjoyed the confidence of the current HoC but has lost it, as opposed to a Prime Minister than never enjoyed the confidence of the current HoC in the first place. The implication is that the former PM (formerly enjoyed confidence but lost it) has a much stronger claim to a dissolution, perhaps amounting to a virtual entitlement, than the latter PM (never enjoyed confidence).
My own take - and I emphasize this is purely a personal opinion and absolutely open to challenge - is that a PM that loses the confidence of the House, having previously enjoyed it, has the choice either to resign (in which case the monarch should send for the Leader of the Opposition) or to request a dissolution; and that such a dissolution should almost always be granted unless the country is in the grip of some altogether exceptional crisis that means a GE is not practicable. If, however, the PM never enjoyed the confidence of the current House, but chooses not to resign but rather to seek a GE, then that request should normally be refused; the only case in which it might be granted is if the composition of the current house is such that it seems impossible that any viable government could be formed.
Perhaps I should write a letter to the Times.
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mboy
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Post by mboy on Dec 4, 2020 10:04:30 GMT
Agree on broadband, though I wasn't aware it was breached. As a conservative, I'm against foreign aid unless it either directly benefits us or is the kind of basic inoculations for polio etc. Cutting it by 4bn is small potatoes. I'd have reduced it further. Still, with this bill on the FTPA taking place in the first year of a government, with hundreds dying each day from COVID, at least the Cons will not be able to lecture the Lib Dems any more on prioritising constitutional issues. I wonder if this has been spurred by the growing possibility of a No Deal Brexit and the possible need for another election springing from that?
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Merseymike
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Post by Merseymike on Dec 4, 2020 10:10:15 GMT
Still, with this bill on the FTPA taking place in the first year of a government, with hundreds dying each day from COVID, at least the Cons will not be able to lecture the Lib Dems any more on prioritising constitutional issues. I wonder if this has been spurred by the growing possibility of a No Deal Brexit and the possible need for another election springing from that? Why would a government with a majority of 80 call an early election for that reason?
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mboy
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Post by mboy on Dec 4, 2020 11:47:14 GMT
For the ability to threaten wavering/rebelling MPs that he'll call an election if he cannot get any No Deal legislation through...
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Post by Davıd Boothroyd on Dec 4, 2020 12:03:29 GMT
Reviving the prerogative must automatically revive the concept of the non-statutory vote of confidence, and of the ability of governments to make suicide threats in order to get their MPs to vote for very unpopular things.
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Post by grahammurray on Dec 4, 2020 12:11:01 GMT
I've often seen the argument that says a PM wields great power over his/her Parliamentary party by having the power to call a snap election that threatens their job or ministerial position. This would only seem to apply if the PM were politically suicidal or the rebels were predominantly in marginal seats.
Does anyone have a plausible example of when this threat was ever utilised?
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DrW
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Post by DrW on Dec 4, 2020 12:25:11 GMT
I've often seen the argument that says a PM wields great power over his/her Parliamentary party by having the power to call a snap election that threatens their job or ministerial position. This would only seem to apply if the PM were politically suicidal or the rebels were predominantly in marginal seats. Does anyone have a plausible example of when this threat was ever utilised? Major wielded it over the heads of the Maastricht rebels in the 90s, I think (although I may be wrong) over a vote on the Social Chapter. The threat may also have been used for the EC Finance Bill in 1994. I can’t think of an occasion where a government has been forced to carry through on its threat though.
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mboy
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Post by mboy on Dec 4, 2020 12:25:46 GMT
I've often seen the argument that says a PM wields great power over his/her Parliamentary party by having the power to call a snap election that threatens their job or ministerial position. This would only seem to apply if the PM were politically suicidal or the rebels were predominantly in marginal seats. Does anyone have a plausible example of when this threat was ever utilised? John Major used it over the Maastricht vote. It worked. Edit: blast - beaten by a few seconds
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Post by islington on Dec 4, 2020 12:29:29 GMT
Reviving the prerogative must automatically revive the concept of the non-statutory vote of confidence, and of the ability of governments to make suicide threats in order to get their MPs to vote for very unpopular things. Yes. That's the whole point.
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J.G.Harston
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Post by J.G.Harston on Dec 4, 2020 12:35:03 GMT
My own take - and I emphasize this is purely a personal opinion and absolutely open to challenge - is that a PM that loses the confidence of the House, having previously enjoyed it, has the choice either to resign (in which case the monarch should send for the Leader of the Opposition) or to request a dissolution; and that such a dissolution should almost always be granted unless the country is in the grip of some altogether exceptional crisis that means a GE is not practicable. If, however, the PM never enjoyed the confidence of the current House, but chooses not to resign but rather to seek a GE, then that request should normally be refused; the only case in which it might be granted is if the composition of the current house is such that it seems impossible that any viable government could be formed. Why send for the leader of the opposition? They are just as likely to lose the confidence of the house, the monarch has to send for somebody who *can* gain the confidence of the house. Eg, if there are 350 Cons, 250 Lab, 50 Others, and the prime minister loses the confidence of the house, sending for the leader of the opposition is sending for somebody who is immediately going to lose the confidence of the house. The monarch *has* to send for somebody - anybody - who will gain the confidence of the House. If they cannot, the monarch should advise the prime minister that they should request a dissolution.
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mboy
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Post by mboy on Dec 4, 2020 12:40:52 GMT
Reviving the prerogative must automatically revive the concept of the non-statutory vote of confidence, and of the ability of governments to make suicide threats in order to get their MPs to vote for very unpopular things. Yes. That's the whole point. I swear I can hear the clicking of the brains of some of the cheerleaders for FTPA abolition, now thinking: "Oh...so...actually, this gives any PM the power to crush popular backbencher rebellions? That's...not really, what I had wanted..."
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Post by grahammurray on Dec 4, 2020 12:53:27 GMT
I've often seen the argument that says a PM wields great power over his/her Parliamentary party by having the power to call a snap election that threatens their job or ministerial position. This would only seem to apply if the PM were politically suicidal or the rebels were predominantly in marginal seats. Does anyone have a plausible example of when this threat was ever utilised? Major wielded it over the heads of the Maastricht rebels in the 90s, I think (although I may be wrong) over a vote on the Social Chapter. The threat may also have been used for the EC Finance Bill in 1994. I can’t think of an occasion where a government has been forced to carry through on its threat though. Thank you.
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Post by grahammurray on Dec 4, 2020 12:54:38 GMT
I've often seen the argument that says a PM wields great power over his/her Parliamentary party by having the power to call a snap election that threatens their job or ministerial position. This would only seem to apply if the PM were politically suicidal or the rebels were predominantly in marginal seats. Does anyone have a plausible example of when this threat was ever utilised? John Major used it over the Maastricht vote. It worked. Edit: blast - beaten by a few seconds Thanks anyway.
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Post by Davıd Boothroyd on Dec 4, 2020 13:01:55 GMT
Reviving the prerogative must automatically revive the concept of the non-statutory vote of confidence, and of the ability of governments to make suicide threats in order to get their MPs to vote for very unpopular things. Yes. That's the whole point. I'd argue that removing the ability of governments to do this was one of the worst aspects of the FTPA. It is interesting to speculate what would have happened in December 2018 had it not been in place - presumably Theresa May would have made the vote on her deal an issue of confidence.
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carlton43
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Post by carlton43 on Dec 4, 2020 15:15:01 GMT
Agree on broadband, though I wasn't aware it was breached. As a conservative, I'm against foreign aid unless it either directly benefits us or is the kind of basic inoculations for polio etc. Cutting it by 4bn is small potatoes. I'd have reduced it further. Still, with this bill on the FTPA taking place in the first year of a government, with hundreds dying each day from COVID, at least the Cons will not be able to lecture the Lib Dems any more on prioritising constitutional issues. We are very glad that you have pointed that out for us, otherwise none of us would have realized that the constitutional bill to abolish the FTPA was a cause of hundreds of deaths every day. Who would have thought that by the simple expedient of denying ourselves that piece of legislation or by putting it further back in the 5-year political agenda we could have saved all those lives? I mean to say, the two things did not look to be related in any way! Thank goodness you have been able to point this out before more harm was done.
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Post by islington on Dec 4, 2020 15:51:14 GMT
My own take - and I emphasize this is purely a personal opinion and absolutely open to challenge - is that a PM that loses the confidence of the House, having previously enjoyed it, has the choice either to resign (in which case the monarch should send for the Leader of the Opposition) or to request a dissolution; and that such a dissolution should almost always be granted unless the country is in the grip of some altogether exceptional crisis that means a GE is not practicable. If, however, the PM never enjoyed the confidence of the current House, but chooses not to resign but rather to seek a GE, then that request should normally be refused; the only case in which it might be granted is if the composition of the current house is such that it seems impossible that any viable government could be formed. Why send for the leader of the opposition? They are just as likely to lose the confidence of the house, the monarch has to send for somebody who *can* gain the confidence of the house. Eg, if there are 350 Cons, 250 Lab, 50 Others, and the prime minister loses the confidence of the house, sending for the leader of the opposition is sending for somebody who is immediately going to lose the confidence of the house. The monarch *has* to send for somebody - anybody - who will gain the confidence of the House. If they cannot, the monarch should advise the prime minister that they should request a dissolution. Well, if there are 350 Tories (assuming a House of 650) then they have a majority and the Government shouldn't be losing confidence votes. If it does, then apparently the Tory majority is severely fractured and probably shouldn't be counted as a single bloc.
Given our adversarial political system, it's reasonable to interpret a vote of no confidence in the Government as an implied vote of confidence in the LotO as replacement PM. In the situation described, in which the PM has lost a confidence vote and resigned, sending for LotO is the logical and obvious thing to do; any other action would, I think, risk exposing the monarch to serious political criticism - something that a prudent monarch would want to go to almost any lengths to avoid.
Assuming the votes aren't there for the LotO to take over and govern effectively, I suggest he or she then has two plausible options, both effectively coming to the same thing: either take office as PM and ask for a GE on the strength of the confidence implied by the motion of no confidence in the previous Gov't; or try to govern, lose a confidence vote, and then ask for a GE on the grounds that the House has now rejected two governments. Either way, it's hard to see how the dissolution request could be refused.
A third option, I suppose, if the LotO is a really deep political strategist willing to take risks, is to decline to take office so the monarch has no choice but to invite the PM to carry on. Disraeli did this in 1873 after Gladstone lost a confidence vote. Disraeli's thinking was the the Gladstone ministry had palpably run out of energy and ideas and was doing itself more and more discredit the longer it stayed in office. It was a risky strategy and would have backfired if Gladstone and his colleagues had somehow found a refreshed sense of purpose. But they didn't; they staggered on until the GE the following year, when Disraeli triumphed with the Tories' first outright majority since 1841.
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Post by johnhemming on Dec 4, 2020 17:14:57 GMT
The logic of this is that Boris Johnson needs more power.
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Post by islington on Dec 4, 2020 20:27:35 GMT
The logic of this is that Boris Johnson needs more power. Well, only inasmuch as he's the incumbent.
The logic is more that governments of whatever stripe need some means of upholding party discipline.
This may be an unpopular view, but I think this is good for democracy because it means that as an ordinary elector I can cast my vote for a candidate with reasonable confidence that he or she will give general support to his or her party, especially if it's in government.
If I wanted an MP who will go off ploughing whichever furrow takes his or her fancy, I'd vote for an independent candidate. But I don't do that, and neither do most other voters. Instead we vote for candidates with a party affiliation, essentially because the party label offers some kind of predictability about how they will behave if elected. We're voting for a party label, not for the individual.
Having said all that, I'm not so worried about the occasional rebellion involving relatively small numbers who are particularly unhappy about some one-off issue. But I'm deeply concerned about the current trend towards larger, more organized semi-permanent groupings of serial rebels, seeking to take collective decisions about how to vote - a party within a party.
Will abolishing the FTPA weaken these groupings by encouraging their members to give their allegiance first and foremost to the party they were elected to support?
I don't know, but I hope so.
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Post by greenchristian on Dec 4, 2020 20:45:57 GMT
The logic of this is that Boris Johnson needs more power. Well, only inasmuch as he's the incumbent. The logic is more that governments of whatever stripe need some means of upholding party discipline. Which is what party disciplinary systems and the whip's office are for. Using the power to call general elections as a means of upholding party discipline is, in my view, an abuse of that power. If the government needs more disciplinary powers, then give them extra disciplinary powers, don't give them a non-disciplinary power that can arguably be used as a disciplinary threat. A government using a GE to quell internal party dissent has just as much potential to backfire on them as we've seen with David Cameron's attempt to use a referendum to achieve the same end. That suggests that you would much prefer a presidential system (where the government is essentially an elected dictator) than a parliamentary one (where government is supposed to be subordinate to the collective judgement of MPs). The current system is not designed to accommodate the electorate voting for the party, rather than their local candidate, so your preference here is pretty much opposed to the entire system.
Also, I don't see that this will undermine the trend for pressure groups within a Parliamentary party to become serial rebels and parties-within-parties. The ERG proved that this strategy works quite effectively, and such pressure groups are unlikely to be as threatened by the prospect of a GE as the government is. At most it raises the stakes for intra-party disputes, but it doesn't put the genie back in the bottle.
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