Colombian election 2018

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This is my area of academic research and main topic of interest, but I'm unsure of how much interest there is for Latin American politics on here given how the Venezuela thread ended up.

I'll just leave a link to my posts elsewhere for those interested: uselectionatlas.org/FORUM/index.php?topic=291773.msg6212933#msg6212933

Results: presidente2018.registraduria.gov.co/resultados/html/resultados.html

I will gladly discuss this further.

[Devil Wincarnate]

Please do. Venezuela is different in that it is a useful domestic punching bag for us...

[The Bishop]

Even though their candidate was well behind the front runner and remains very unlikely to win the run-off, this was one of the best results for the left in Colombia *ever*.

[John Chanin]

But it does ensure that Duque will win, which might not work out well. If Fajardo had finished second, he might have won the run off. Petro will not.

[Deleted]

May 29, 2018 3:31:08 GMT Hash said:

This is my area of academic research and main topic of interest, but I'm unsure of how much interest there is for Latin American politics on here given how the Venezuela thread ended up.

I'll just leave a link to my posts elsewhere for those interested: uselectionatlas.org/FORUM/index.php?topic=291773.msg6212933#msg6212933

Results: presidente2018.registraduria.gov.co/resultados/html/resultados.html

I will gladly discuss this further.

I think reposting your long "Colombian politics in short" post + the candidate biographies from Atlas Forum in this thread would be useful, as well as your excellent post about the candidates' environmental policies from OWW, which I think some people on here would find both very interesting and surprising. 
...
You wrote on Atlas that: "Unlike with Petro, who has a personalist cult following, Fajardo's success is potentially replicable by others in the future (I am thinking of Angélica Lozano and Juanita Goebertus, who are both amazing women). With Petro, Fajardo's success is the proof that this election may mark a new era in Colombian presidential politics - one where machines alone can't put presidents, but where opinion with few machines may potentially put a president."

Could you elaborate a bit on this potential opening for a centre-left candidate running an issue based campaign. Given that some machine support is still needed, where could that come from? And also why do you see Lozano and Goebertus as potential standard-bearers for the left? (or is that just wishful thinking on your part?).

There were many female running mates this time (Marta Lucía Ramírez, Ángela María Robledo, and Claudia López for the "Big 3" + Clara López for de la Calle) and you described the three former more positively than the top name on their respective tickets - especially the two "leftists" Robledo and Claudia López. Is it an electoral liability to run a woman as the top name on a ticket?

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May 30, 2018 2:28:50 GMT @vintris said:

...
You wrote on Atlas that: "Unlike with Petro, who has a personalist cult following, Fajardo's success is potentially replicable by others in the future (I am thinking of Angélica Lozano and Juanita Goebertus, who are both amazing women). With Petro, Fajardo's success is the proof that this election may mark a new era in Colombian presidential politics - one where machines alone can't put presidents, but where opinion with few machines may potentially put a president."

Could you elaborate a bit on this potential opening for a centre-left candidate running an issue based campaign. Given that some machine support is still needed, where could that come from? And also why do you see Lozano and Goebertus as potential standard-bearers for the left? (or is that just wishful thinking on your part?).

There were many female running mates this time (Marta Lucía Ramírez, Ángela María Robledo, and Claudia López for the "Big 3" + Clara López for de la Calle) and you described the three former more positively than the top name on their respective tickets - especially the two "leftists" Robledo and Claudia López. Is it an electoral liability to run a woman as the top name on a ticket?

If I am right that this presidential election is the beginning of a 'new era', and depending on how Uribismo 2.0 goes, then I do think that in future presidential elections - which will be increasingly defined by issue-based campaigns, contests between candidates differentiating themselves on matters other than personality cults and more ideologically coherent debates - that there will be an opening for centre-left candidates. The issue will be, as you said, where machine support comes from - particularly if local and congressional elections continue to be defined by local issues, local candidate personality, clientelism and machine politics - and how somebody like Fajardo would hypothetically govern. I may end up being totally wrong, or too optimistic about the long-term outlook, but I am pretty sure that Colombia is in the early years of a transition phase in its politics, in which centre-left issue-based politics may become more widespread and where a 'modern' right may emerge to replace Uribismo (which, thankfully, won't be eternal). Whether this is in 2022 is unclear.

Lozano and Goebertus are two very intelligent and highly capable women, one who has proven to be an excellent legislator amidst hundreds of grubby mediocre men, and the other who has a wealth of experience on key issues like transitional justice and peace processes. There's a lot of wishful thinking on my part, but I do think that both can have a promising future. Lozano has already jumped to the Senate, very successfully, and will undoubtedly be one of the main voices of reason and opposition in the new Senate (which will otherwise still be, at best, mediocre).

I don't think running a woman is a liability, since Marta Lucía Ramírez was able to win nearly 2 million votes in 2014 without much blue machine support, even though Colombian politics remains particularly machista and the male legislators and politicians never stand out for their forward-thinking views on gender issues/women's rights. It is quite positive that, despite being a lesbian and really not confirming to  'traditional gender roles' (unlike, say, Marta Lucía Ramírez), Claudia López's sexual orientation was never really an issue of public debate in this campaign, except for homophobic lunatics like Ordóñez. There was even a strong incentive to have a woman running-mate across the board this year (except for Vargas Lleras), to balance out male-led tickets. I think that, unlike this year, 2022 may see some strong women candidate, especially if Marta Lucía Ramírez tries to 'pull a Vargas Lleras' and seeks to be the right's candidate in 2022 (assuming, of course, nobody changes the 'articulito' to allow Eternal President Uribe to return, which I really doubt will happen).

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Following vintris' advice, I will copy over relevant posts I wrote elsewhere, which hopefully aren't too long to scare people away.

Colombian politics in short

System of government: A decentralized presidential republic, which isn't all that exciting or different from basically literally every other country in Latin America in its broad outlines.

• President: Directly elected to a single, non-renewable 4-year term, ineligible for reelection, using a two round system like France. The Vice President is elected on the same ticket, and is gaining in political prominence. The executive branch is stronger than the legislative, and the idea of 'divided government' doesn't really exist.
  
• Congress: Bicameral (House and Senate), elected to a 4-year term prior to the presidential election (March). Senators are elected a single national constituency. Reps. are elected in multi-member territorial constituencies, most of them corresponding to departments. Elected a somewhat unique and bizarre mess of an electoral system, which is still somewhat preferable to the abomination of an electoral system used prior to 2003.

History: Yeah, won't even try to give an abridged version here. To sum it up: a lot of conflict, but very few instances of military authoritarianism or coups, and a long overrated history of 'democracy' with regular elections. Hybrid institutions, with formal democratic institutions coexisting with informal authoritarian structures or practices, and a gap between de jure and de facto. Substantial and significant regional differences, despite not being a federal state since 1886. A weak and somewhat illegitimate state which long lacked any semblance of real national unity or nationalist myth. The survival of clientelistic practices. The absence or weakness of populism, in sharp contrast to practically every other Latin American country, at least until 2002. The weakness of the democratic left in contrast to most Latin American countries today. Massive political apathy, with some of the lowest turnout anywhere in the Americas.

The current armed conflict is far more complicated and much less straightforward than people commonly assume, or that popular TV shows depict it.

Parties: In reality, they don't really matter for the topic at hand, but an explanation may be useful for later on. These classifications are broad categories and not really all that useful, but whatever.

Traditional parties: The Liberal and Conservative parties, founded in the nineteenth century and which have survived far longer than in most Latin American countries. Despite their best attempts to pretend otherwise, they don't have much in the way of ideology and are really federations of regional and local clientelistic machines and their caciques, particularly since the 1970s and the loss of their only real timeless principle (murdering one another). Much weakened since the late 1990s, but still important major parties. The Liberals do make some real efforts at having coherent policies and paying lip service to the 'great traditions' of Colombian liberalism, which is perhaps marginally more positive than Colombian conservatism but still not something I'd really be proud of. The Conservatives don't even try and their congressmen will sell themselves off to successive government, at the cost of a lot of blackmailing and hefty bribes.

Uribismo: Only once in opposition did uribismo - followers of former President/current senator Álvaro Uribe Vélez (2002-10) - become a single political party, the Centro Democrático (CD), which merits a category of its own. Uribismo is a personalistic, 'caudillistic' movement built around Uribe and his ideas, whatever they may be, which means that it is one of the most disciplined, cohesive and ideologically (semi-)coherent parties in Colombia. Uribismo claims to be 'centrist' but is very obviously right-wing/far-right, both economically and 'socially', with Uribe's main legacy being 'democratic security' (a hard-line, hawkish, 'anti-terrorist' security policy). Uribismo often comes dangerously close to creepy cultism in its hero worship of Uribe, and it is a movement with a lot ugly hatred and vitriol. It ranges from rather bland regional political clans, former Uribe administration officials and fairly intelligent and respectable personalities to far-right lunatics. Uribe, like Donald Trump, is extremely active on Twitter and is increasingly mentally unhinged.

Neo-traditional parties: Parties like the Partido de la U, Cambio Radical (CR) and Opción Ciudadana. Founded between the late 1990s and mid-2000s, often by dissidents of the traditional parties, they are all predominantly federations of regional and local clientelistic machines and their caciques with varying degrees of internal discipline and coherence. The Partido de la U has by now lost all ideological coherence and most of its internal discipline, deeply internally divided and held together largely for legal purposes. CR is far more disciplined and coherent, held together by its de facto leader Germán Vargas Lleras, although also a very venal, unscrupulous party with few qualms about endorsing objectively horrible people. Opción Ciudadana, which may thankfully die soon, takes these traits to a whole other level as a 'trash collector' party which collects and recycles other parties' trash (beyond the pale individuals), who then support the government behind the scenes and are just in it for the bribes and free food.

Alternative parties: Newer parties like the Polo Democrático Alternativo, Greens, UP, MAIS and now the 'list of decency' with alternative referring to their largely non/anti-clientelistic ways and greater ideological coherence, largely 'progressive' and left-wing. The Polo is Colombia's main left-wing party since 2005, but is a hot mess and no longer really represents much of the left, dogged by infighting for over a decade. The Greens, who got their real start with the green wave that never was in 2010, have often lacked a common direction, historically made up of conflicting groups, although now appear more united around centrist/centre-left pragmatism and progressive reformism. The 'list of decency' is a new multi-party coalition list identified with Gustavo Petro, the main overarching tone being anti-establishment/anti-system radical/alternative left and ecosocialism - similar to Mélenchon's France insoumise.

Christian (evangelical) parties: A resurgent category which includes the MIRA party and the new 'Colombia Juste Libres' alliance. Christian (meaning evangelical/Pentecostal) parties, except MIRA, disappeared around 2003 and participated through other parties. MIRA is a testimonial party and political arm of the Church of God Ministry of Jesus Christ International. It has a small but disciplined base, but is nevertheless widely recognized by others for their hard work as legislators.

How you win elections: With votes and a lot of dirty illegal money. There are basically two kinds of votes:

• Voto de opinión: Predominantly urban votes not 'controlled' by a clientelist machine, voting based on individual political opinion, issues or candidate. Found largely in large cities like departmental capitals.
  
• Voto de maquinarias/estructuras: Refers to the votes 'controlled' by a clientelist machine or 'structure', associated with a particular boss (cacique/gamonal) and their family and networks of operators. Found largely in poorer rural areas, and stereotypically associated with the Caribbean coast, they mobilize their voters through vote buying, patron-client relationships and associated personal/material benefits and the provision of transportation and a free lunch on election day. Strongest in local and congressional elections, where the political futures of machine's boss or 'heirs' are directly at stake, they require an extra push (and lots of money) in presidential elections and it is still estimated they transfer less than half of their potential to their presidential candidate. Once in power, their support is critical for the approval of a president's agenda, and is ensured through 'marmalade' (pork-barrel spending) and 'quotas' (patronage appointments).
  

While it is possible to win a congressional or mayoral election with only one of the above, no presidential candidate has, to date, won without both of the above. Antanas Mockus tried, and failed, to win without machines in 2010. Juan Manuel Santos and Álvaro Uribe won both of their elections with both, although Uribe in 2002 also had a third category (guy holding a gun to your head and telling you who to vote for). The common wisdom is that, in presidential elections, 70% of votes are from the former category but that in congressional elections 70% of votes from the latter category.

Key political issues: It's hella depressing, although this election offers sharper ideological contrasts than any of the last ones.

• The very difficult and bleak future of the 2016 peace agreement with the FARC, a polarizing and complicated multi-faceted issue which raises key questions about transitional justice, victims' rights, impunity/justice for war crimes, drug trafficking, coca cultivation/illicit crops, reintegration of demobilized fighters and the political reincorporation of the FARC.
  
• The growing security threats in critical regions posed by guerrillas, FARC dissidents and neo-paramilitary criminal groups which threatens the viability of the peace agreement and has already had massive humanitarian consequences. As recent events along the Ecuadorian border show, it is a transnational problem.
  
• The Venezuelan migrant crisis, a humanitarian issue of massive proportions which creates a major challenge in a country which has been a country of mass emigration for most of its recent history. The sheer number of Venezuelan migrants, many of whom are only 'passing through', puts more pressure on already weak healthcare, education, job market and border security.
  
• Relations with Venezuela and the Maduro dictatorship. Both soft and hard strategies (i.e. 'my new best friend' and diplomatic standoffs) have, basically, failed.
  
• Corruption is widespread and spreading everywhere, challenging the legitimacy and strength of an already weak democracy. Naturally, everyone is against it, but very few, if any, of the solutions being proposed would realistically have a major impact and there is an infuriatingly large amount of hypocrisy on this issue.
  
• Judicial reform is necessary to fix obvious problems in the institutional design of the judiciary and 'clean up the mess', but nobody can agree on how to fix it. An additional problem, more academic but very serious, is avoiding gimmicky populist 'quick fixes' which would weaken judicial independence, legal protection of fundamental rights and the 'good' aspects of the current system.
  
• Colombia's Obamacare-like healthcare system is hated by everyone and has a lot of problems, although concrete solutions which could be imagined to have a positive impact are very hard to come by.
  
• Security in Colombia is instinctively associated with the conflict, but the real security concern of most urban citizens is about petty crime, drug dealers, delinquents, robberies/assaults and microtrafficking. Debates, as elsewhere, are between more punitive/retributive and preventive/restorative views on criminality and its causes.
  
• Colombia's economy has slowed down in the past 2-3 years, with growing pessimism about the general state of the economy. As elsewhere, policy debates are around the benefits of corporate tax cuts, indirect v. direct taxation, deregulation/'simplification' and basically how to create jobs and expand the formal economy. The issue of poverty somewhat overlaps here as well.
  
• A growing debate about the environmental, natural resources, mining and local input over resource extraction projects. Are environmental protection and Colombia's extractivist, mineral-dependent economic model compatible at all? Should local communities have a say over mining and other extraction projects in their territory, particularly when having that say is vetoing such projects?
  
• An overdue pension reform which I am less well-read about but which regardless promises nasty surprises since all candidates are still promising that everyone can have the cake and eat it.
  
• There are many problems with Colombia's political institutions and electoral systems which need fixing, but little to no trust in those who need to make those changes (Congress), which is giving rise to more radical demagogic and potentially dangerous 'solutions' like a constituent assembly. Recent attempts at institutional/political/electoral reform - in 2015 and 2017 - either failed because congressmen were in no mood (2017) or got watered down by judicial review (2015), and the defects of past reforms (2003) are clearer than before.
  
• Political debate has turned bitter, nasty and acrimonious with lies and half-truths quite common. Political Twitter is a brutal minefield which makes you lose faith in human existence, particularly when the likes of 'Popeye' (Pablo Escobar's former assassin) has turned into a right-wing political commentator. It would be great if the next president could reduce this nastiness, but that appears very unlikely.
  

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Iván Duque (CD, supp. MIRA, CJL, Cons.): The 41-year old uribista candidate is a former one-term senator, first elected in 2014. He comes from a political family, but has a more technocratic career, having worked for the IDB for 9 years. He makes up for his relative inexperience with his youth, charisma, likeability, intelligence, self-confidence and astuteness. Duque is a relative moderate in the world of uribismo, where the far-right furibista elements were suspicious of him as a potential 'Trojan Horse' who could betray Uribe like Santos did, although these concerns were allayed or silenced. Duque enjoys pretending that he is an anti-populist, Macron-like centrist reformist, although in reality he is the most right-wing of the major candidates with a rather generic right-wing conservative platform you'd find in most places. He is the quintessential 'modern' centre-right candidate - young, slick, smooth talker, adept at political marketing strategies. His gimmick is the 'orange economy' (creative economy) and everything 'high tech' - incessantly boasting Big Data, digitalized-everything, e-government, new technologies etc. His economic policy is boilerplate neoliberalism (with some caveats and exceptions), he strongly supports the traditional 'war on drugs' (including aerial fumigation and forced crop substitution) and is - at least in public - the most socially conservative of the major candidates (opposing same-sex marriage and adoption rights), although I have reason to believe that he personally is rather liberal there. He claims that he would not tear up the peace agreement - his line is 'ni trizas ni risas' (neither scissors nor smiles/laughs) - but would make 'structural modifications' to it, which opponents claim would end up destroying the peace agreement in letter and spirit. His 'structural modifications' would do away with most of the 'structural reforms' included in the text and intended to prevent future violence.

Duque's problem isn't him - he is an intelligent, well-spoken, level-headed articulate right-winger (a rarity in the world of Trumpismo-Fordismo) - but rather Álvaro Uribe, portrayed by all of his opponents as the puppet master, a claim both men deny although it is a fact that Duque's presidency would mean the return of Uribe and his loyalists to power, which worries many people (for good reason). The concern is that Uribe, who from his Twitter activity appears increasingly unhinged and angry, will come and take his revenge on everybody who crossed him in the past 8 years (the courts, certain politicians, the media etc.) and destroy the work of 'the traitor' Santos. Again, the problem isn't Duque, but instead the people behind him - including book-burning Ayatollah Alejandro Ordóñez, far-right moron María Fernanda Cabal, Rafael Nieto and all the 'good boys' of Uribe's administrations 'victims of political persecution'.

Running-mate: Marta Lucía Ramírez, an experienced politician who notably served as foreign trade minister (1998-2002), the first woman defence minister (2002-03) and senator (2006-09). She was the Conservative Party's presidential candidate in 2014 and won 15.5%, despite lacking the support of most of the Conservative caucus. A presidential candidate this year as well, she lost to Duque in the right-wing primary on March 11 and he picked her as his running-mate that same night. She is not a loyal uribista and is less beholden to Uribe, notably opposing his 'second reelection'.

RESULT - 39.14%

Gustavo Petro (Petro President/Colombia Humana, supp. MAIS, AICO): The anti-establishment populist left candidate appealing to the indignados while terrifying the right as the incarnation of castrochavismo. He is a former M-19 guerrillero (imprisoned in the 1980s, demobilized in 1990), who served in the House (1991-1994, 1998-2006) and Senate (2006-2010) and most famously as mayor of Bogotá (2012-2015). He was the Polo's presidential candidate in 2010. Petro is a polarizing figure, who has some passionate supporters on social media (second only in their cultist devotion to uribistas) but also passionate 'haters' on the right who panic at the prospect of Petro, particularly in the current circumstances with Venezuela. Comparable in his personality to Mélenchon, Petro is a complicated man: an outstanding legislator, but a poor administrator; laudable ideas (at least to leftists) but poor execution. Elected mayor of Bogotá in 2011, he came in with one of the most ambitious left-wing urban agendas but left office with low popularity, a mixed and incomplete record. One of his problems is that he is arrogant, narcissistic, controlling and egocentric - he thinks that he is brilliant, loves the sound of his own voice and has an over inflated ego. He is not a 'team player' and is bad at creating and keeping a team together. Petro's platform is one of the most left-wing in Colombian history, directly attacking the mineral-dependent extractivist economic model (oil and mining) and vowing to replace it with a poorly explained ecosocialism with re-industrialization, increased agricultural productivity and renewable energies. He also challenges the neoliberal/right-wing public policies dominant since the 1990s, promising free post-secondary education, universal healthcare, robust public pensions, publicly-owned public services and agrarian reform. He is the most socially liberal candidate, and is also the most credible and vocal supporters of indigenous and Afro-Colombian rights. He views the peace agreement as a good but incomplete starting point for the structural transformations of the country he seeks. But, if elected, he would govern alone with most of the powers against him (courts, Congress, media etc.) and has said that he would call a constituent assembly, a slippery slope and potentially dangerous idea which invites comparisons with Maduro's constituent assembly. Petro's opponents on the right claim he is a castrochavista communist who would be the 'fast track to Venezuela', due in part to his past sympathies for Chávez and his continued whataboutism on the Venezuelan crisis.

Running-mate: Ángela María Robledo, a Green representative since 2014. She is a competent, hard-working, talented and respected left-wing congresswoman who has worked primarily on issues relating to women's rights, victims, children's rights, sexual violence, human rights and social exclusion.

RESULT - 25.08%

Sergio Fajardo (Coalition Colombia - Greens and Polo): Fajardo is a mathematician, former mayor of Medellín (2004-2007) and governor of Antioquia (2012-2015). He is an independent who has made opposition to traditional politics, clientelism and corruption the trademarks of his political career. Although now the target of the usual criticisms and dug-up controversies, his term as mayor coincided with Medellín's much-vaunted and internationally acclaimed transformation into a new model for urban planning and innovation (an embellished image). As governor, education was one of his major priorities, although his record was less than stellar in the end. He was wildly popular as both mayor and governor, and remains the most popular candidate - few people actively dislike or hate him, unlike the two candidates above, because he is not a polarizing or divisive figure. Indeed, in this polarized and acrimonious campaign, Fajardo's strategy is to be the unifying, 'anti-polarization' candidate with an image of 'hope' rather than 'fear'. He is the candidate of the 'Coalition Colombia', a coalition between the Greens and the Polo built around the themes of anti-corruption, education, honesty, good governance, centre-left pragmatism. His platform makes less ambitious promises than Petro, but perhaps more realistic (but also a bit vaguer), somewhat comparable to Justin Trudeau. Fajardo is famously indecisive, intentionally vague and non-committal on many issues (although his final platform is substantive), which is why his support has declined significantly since March, why most of the left - despite the Polo still formally behind him (largely because the Polo is controlled by Jorge Robledo, who hates Petro) - is now behind Petro and why his former financiers in the Antioquia business elite have largely abandoned him for Duque.

Running-mate: Claudia López, a retiring Green senator first elected in 2014 and an acclaimed political scientist and researcher, most famous for her work on 'parapolítica' in the mid-2000s. She is a pugnacious, impassioned woman who is appreciated by her fans on social media for her no holds barred congressional debates on corruption and her straight-talk (calling politicians corrupt to their face and triggering right-wingers). She adds a necessary 'punch' and emotion to Fajardo, the somewhat dry and overly rational math prof, but she is not particularly popular with the economic elite, who don't really appreciate her reminding people how many of them gave money to the paramilitaries and guerrillas. She was one of the three potential pre-candidates of the Coalition, but dropped out last fall (along with Robledo), to clear the field for Fajardo.

RESULT - 23.73%

Germán Vargas Lleras (#Mejor Vargas Lleras, supp. CR, La U, Cons.): Vargas Lleras is the quintessential traditional Colombian elite politician, another product of the old Bogotan political elite (maternal grandson of former president Carlos Lleras Restrepo) and an ambitious politician who has been dreaming of the presidency since he was a teenager. Having gone through all the traditional steps and having patiently waited his turn, the presidency would be the capstone to a long career which began in the late 1980s as a galanista Liberal. He is a former city councillor, four-term senator, presidential candidate (10% in 2010), interior minister, housing minister and most recently Santos II's Vice President (2014-17). He is a very intelligent, experienced micromanager with a feisty, explosive and often unpleasant character, who doesn't tolerate mediocrity and who doesn't have time for phony pleasantries, a personality which everybody learned about with a Dec. 2016 video of him hitting a bodyguard on the head (the coscorrón incident). He has tried to soften that image, 'laughing along' at the the memes of his Addams family-like candidacy announcement video or creating an Instagram account for his dog 'Mancho Vargas'. He also seems to be a genuinely loving father to his only daughter, a talented hip-hop dancer who was forced to grow up in Miami because of death threats against her father since the late 1990s (he is the victim of two terrorist attacks, in which he lost fingers on one of his hands).

But he is also a 'todo vale' (everything/anything goes, the ends justify the means) politician, who has no moral reservations in allying with most of Colombia's disreputable, nasty if not downright criminal political machines/structures (even those led by convicted criminals, like 'el Gordo' García Romero, or, in the past, now convicted murderer Kiko Gómez). Vargas Lleras wants to win the presidency using traditional means: a strong, national alliance of regional caciques and their clientelist machines, without any regard for how nasty or criminal these regional caciques are as long as they can provide votes. Vargas Lleras is a sly political operator with years of experience in the nasty tricks and corrupt alliances which have characterized Colombian politics for decades. urban public opinion isn't very keen on that sort of old politics, so Vargas Lleras also needs to pretend that he is a modern, independent centre-right conservative with a well-defined and thorough policy agenda accompanied by presentable allies - so instead of getting on the ballot through his political party, which has been involved in countless sordid criminal and corrupt alliances over the years, he got ballot access 'by signatures' with his own movement, #Mejor Vargas Lleras. Vargas Lleras is a right-winger, but having failed to compete for uribismo with right-wing votes, has moved a bit to the centre, notably reversing course on the peace agreement and finally supporting it more enthusiastically than ever before. But his economic platform is still typically pro-business right-wing/neoliberal, not very different to Duque except in the details (perhaps a bit more focused on big business rather than small business, and not really interested in pretending to be even a bit 'green). While supportive of the peace agreement, he promises a hard line on security and crime.

Running-mate: Juan Carlos Pinzón, former defence minister (2011-15) and ambassador to the US (2015-17). Santos was Pinzón's former mentor, and he owes all his jobs to Santos, but that didn't keep him from betraying him. He was a right-wing presidential candidate, as an independent, but his rather pathetic campaign didn't get anywhere and he dropped out of the race right after the March 11 congressional election to be Vargas' running-mate. He doesn't bring much to the campaign, except maybe reinforcing uribismo's claims that Vargas is the santista candidate ('the co-pilot on a crashing plane').

RESULT - 7.28%

Humberto de la Calle (Liberal, supp. ASI): De la Calle is a career politician who has been in politics since the 1980s, following a rather typical career path up until the 1990s/2000, at which point he basically dropped out of circulation to re-appear years later as the government's chief negotiator in the peace negotiations with the FARC in Cuba, which is now the main draw of his candidacy. He unsuccessfully ran for president in 1994, losing the Liberal primary to Ernesto Samper, very reluctantly agreeing to be his vice president in a marriage of convenience which was made impossible by the Proceso 8.000 and led de la Calle to resign in 1996. De la Calle received widespread praise for his role as chief negotiator. Not only did he secure an historic peace agreement in the end, but he was crucial throughout the actual peace talks in ensuring the government spoke with a single voice, in keeping the negotiations focused, in resolving disputes and controversies and ensuring that the talks didn’t break down during the several times where they seemed to be on the verge of collapse. This candidacy is about 'defending his baby', with the peace agreement being his key appeal to a small base and the key overarching element of his platform, which basically proposes to build on it to achieve goals like poverty reduction, environmental protection, inclusive/equitable economic growth, long-term peace, better education, tourism, a rural middle-class and clean government. His platform is, overall, socially democratic (despite, ironically, being from the more 'neoliberal' faction of the party in the 1990s), comparable to contemporary W. European social democrats. De la Calle's candidacy never took off, attempts at an alliance with Fajardo failed and his candidacy is now an insurance policy for the Liberal Party to negotiate a deal for the runoff. In an ideal world, de la Calle would make, I think, an excellent president - he is smart, experienced, honest, respectable and a true statesman. But the problem is with the people who (ostensibly) accompany him - the Liberal Party, its leader (Cesar Gaviria) and the Liberals' traditional list of caciques and machine politicians in the congressional elections.

Running-mate: Clara López, former caretaker mayor of Bogotá, 2014 Polo presidential candidate (15%) and labour minister (2016-17). Clara López also dropped out of the race early this year to become de la Calle's running-mate, adding to his 'pro-peace' and centre-left credentials but also the image of him as 'Santos' other candidate' (as Clara joined the cabinet, against her party's orders, in 2016). She was forcibly pushed out of the Polo in 2017 by Jorge Robledo's faction and unsuccessfully tried to build a 'pro-peace' candidacy.

RESULT - 2.06%

Jorge Antonio Trujillo (Todos Somos Colombia): The little-known minor candidate, Trujillo is an evangelical pastor. He briefly served in the Senate in 2009-10 with the 'trash collector' Convergencia Ciudadana/PIN (now Opción Ciudadana) party as a result of the 'carrusel of parapolítica' (as accused senators resigned, allowing defeated lower-ranked candidates to get their seats), but he lost reelection in 2010 (getting about 20,000 preferential votes). He said the 2010-11 rainy season, which killed over 100 people, was 'divine punishment'. He is homophobic, basically believing that homosexuality is an unnatural disease which he promises to help cure. He hasn't been invited to any debates and has really only campaigned in evangelical churches, but most of the evangelical vote is behind Duque. He is the candidate of the new little-known 'Todos Somos Colombia', which got its legal recognition as a party through the 'Afro loophole' - as an Afro-Colombian party, it doesn't need to meet stringent legal requirements for party registration, and is the renamed continuation of the Afro party 'Fundación Ebano', connected to the highly controversial and corrupt former congressman Yahir Acuña (investigated for parapolítica and a professional vote buyer) which became famous in 2014 for winning the 2 special Afro-Colombian seats with candidates who weren't even black.

Running-mate: Freddy Obando, an Afro-Colombian evangelical pastor.

RESULT - 0.39%

[Foggy]

Jun 3, 2018 18:05:09 GMT Hash said:

De la Calle received widespread praise for his role as chief negotiator. Not only did he secure an historic peace agreement in the end, but he was crucial throughout the actual peace talks in ensuring the government spoke with a single voice, in keeping the negotiations focused, in resolving disputes and controversies and ensuring that the talks didn’t break down during the several times where they seemed to be on the verge of collapse. 

I know this is exactly the kind of parallel you were dreading, but: can he come and negotiate Brexit on behalf of the UK government, please? 

On a similar note, I was amused to find out that some local political bosses upon whom 'machine' candidates rely are sometimes known as gamonales.

[Georg Ebner]

GOMEZ DAVILA on His compatriots:

Characteristics of the Colombian: the inability to acquire concrete; everything gets mixed up in his hands; missing morality; the concept of duty is unknown; the only norm is the fear of the policeman or the devil; in his soul there is no moral, spiritual or social order; he overrides all traditions; because he submits passively to any influence, nothing impresses him; nothing thrives or lasts on this shapeless, changeable, docile and loose soil.

I believe, that the only science with papers written by Colombians is the political economy; that's why I doubt it's a science.

If the opportunity arises to commit any beastliness, the Colombian seldom omits it.

The government of these American islands has been taken over since independence from the mestizo descendants of Ginés de Pasamonte.

[Georg Ebner]

Second Round:

TurnOut 53%

54% Duque Marquez (Uribe/Right)
42% Petro (AntiUribe/Left)
04% InValid

Rather strong OutCome for Petro.

[The Bishop]

Indeed, closer than some predicted (though of course not really that close)

[Georg Ebner]

First round:



Second round:

[Hash]

3 weeks ago:


Yesterday: