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Post by curiousliberal on Jan 20, 2020 10:03:57 GMT
Rory Stewart would not of won a majority in December 2019. I imagine he would of put the May WA deal to a referendum, losing more Conservative supporters to the Brexit party and destroying the party. Boris has shown to be far more competent then his rivals would of ever dreamed of. The Conservative party is now united, his a vision and has purpose. The Labour party and Lib Dems are divided, have no vision and healing their wounds from losing the biggest cultural fight in over a generation. He didn't necessarily need to put it to a referendum, given the way the second reading worked out for Boris Johnson's considerably harder Brexit and Stewart's willingness to actually negotiate and compromise as opposed to May's obstinacy. I suspect his final deal might have looked something like the May deal + CU and some workers' rights guarantees which Labour leavers would have wanted. I will agree that if Parliament somehow continued in its obstinacy to block any deal (which would have to be beyond what it had indicated, btw), either a GE or a pre-GE referendum would have happened. I am pretty sure Stewart would have won a pre-Brexit GE if he was able to get most of his own MPs behind him immediately prior to it (and getting halfway to that is practically a prerequisite for becoming leader), though perhaps by less than Johnson. *If* there had been a referendum and his deal had won, then I don't see why you wouldn't have won a 'let's implement it' subsequent GE in the result of further obstinacy (and by a larger margin than Johnson's victory, IMO). *If* there had been a referendum and his deal had lost, then I'll agree there would be a serious opening for the Brexit Party, but not otherwise. The Conservative Party is indeed led by a vision, but it is only their own vision insofar as their vision is that of a strong leader. The vast majority of members are not aware of and did not vote on what is still an incredibly opaque agenda. You should be very pleased with your electoral performance, but there are almost as many uncertainties for Conservatives in a Johnson administration as there are for the rest of us. If I were a backbencher, I would be asking questions. Btw, this is hardly the most important cultural fight in a generation. Even though it got lots of media attention and sparked stupid parliamentary games, there were far more critical fronts on which we've won in the last generation (civil partnerships and equal marriage, shared parental leave, etc) and I can say we won because most of you are now on board with these victories and don't even consider them battles (that is to say - we all won). I sincerely hope Brexit becomes something from which we all win, but expect otherwise. There are also far more important battles which we are losing, e.g. doing more to save refugees, and victories which this government poses a greater threat to than Brexit (e.g. not dabbling in voter suppression measures).
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Post by curiousliberal on Jan 20, 2020 9:52:45 GMT
Events (and Brown) would do for him, and if they involved a financial crisis, that might have really helped Brown with the blame game in 2010. There's a smaller chance they might actually hurt Brown, if they managed to provoke a why-didn't-you-dethrone-him-earlier backlash, but their power struggle was common knowledge well before its end.
Blair hypotheticals always remind me of that r/neoliberal fan-post in which he reassumes leadership of the Labour party and leads a successful election campaign against the Johnson-led Conservatives (featuring a bizarre chumminess with an ennobled David Cameron). That's unrealistic, but I wonder whether the recent prominence of elder statesmen in active leadership roles in the democratic world might inspire him to take a more active role in 2024.
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Post by curiousliberal on Jan 20, 2020 9:45:09 GMT
It's pretty much impossible for Rory to get there. Those MPs were the voters but he was too busy talking to the media. The guy has a great backstory, on paper, but he is a boring wet rag. His colleagues knew that: they worked with him. He actually proposed some fresh policy which should have been interesting, but Brexit was consuming all the political oxygen and he simply couldn't compete in the race to the bottom. He would have lost the leadership election, though if Boris Johnson had pulled a Leadsom, I think Stewart would have gotten a better deal than Johnson's through Parliament prior to any election. If there was an early election at some point afterwards (one was likely before 2022 due to attrition unless the Conservative Party somehow reconciled with all of its defectors) and a deal had passed Parliament but had not yet been implemented (that is, we hadn't exited the EU or at least the transition period), Stewart would have won, probably more comprehensively than Johnson did. Jeremy Hunt's campaign also took me by surprise as far more appealing than I'd anticipated. Certain members of the blue room are rightly suspicious when opposition partisans show admiration for their favourites' rivals, but the fact that he proposed profound reform for social care would have been impressive in itself even if I'd completely disagreed with the content. His debate performance was very strong.
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Post by curiousliberal on Jan 20, 2020 9:41:14 GMT
A new record was set today with the defeat of Dennis Skinner after 49 & 1/2 years. How do all political careers end? In different ways. Retirement or death are how plenty end, just as other careers do, and are not treated as failure in other professions. Furthermore, if you get booted out because the voters consider the work for which they hired you to have been achieved, then in an odd sort of way, you might have succeeded. I'd say Vince Cable's career ended as a clear success, with the only personal disappointment being that his scheduled introduction of an Assisted Dying private members' bill was stopped by the dissolution of Parliament.
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Post by curiousliberal on Jan 20, 2020 9:26:02 GMT
Sorry - I should point out that the colours of the map are reversed on Atlas for general elections. An anachronistic quirk to do with the site's history. okay that makes sense. Though Michigan is gain when Wisconsin isn't. That's weird In a proportional sense, Michigan was closer than Wisconsin in 2016. Pennsylvania was too - only by a hair's breadth, but Biden would presumably get a small bump there on the basis of his background. Winning Nebraska's 2nd and losing Wisconsin is what stretches credibility a bit here, but they are quite different places so it's not at all implausible. It's worth noting that the House results were also marginally better in Michigan and more so in Pennsylvania than in Wisconsin in 2018, and (though these races are less nationalised) Scott Walker lost by just 1% with the Democrats securing the governorship in Michigan and retaining incumbency in Pennsylvania by better margins (9% and 17% respectively). It's early days yet, but both Biden and Sanders seem slightly stronger in Michigan match-ups with Trump than they do in Wisconsin ones. nelson Isn't there a near-equal risk of Biden/Sanders electors being faithless if they eke out a narrow win? It's not as if a sitting president wouldn't be well-placed to lobby them.
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Post by curiousliberal on Jan 20, 2020 8:30:13 GMT
Trump gaining Nevada, New Hampshire and New York isn't impossible but is very unlikely. Democrats have a better chance at gaining Michigan than Ohio too Sorry - I should point out that the colours of the map are reversed on Atlas for general elections. An anachronistic quirk to do with the site's history.
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Post by curiousliberal on Jan 20, 2020 8:22:10 GMT
This exact electoral scenario (courtesy of Atlas) is obviously very unlikely given how many specific priors would need to fall into place, but I think something like it in which the electoral college victory is very narrow (so much so that the potential for faithless electors starts to matter) may not be. Personally, I'd consider it a death knell for liberal democracy in the USA and would expect riots as a result, but what are your thoughts on this?
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Post by curiousliberal on Jan 20, 2020 1:18:23 GMT
While Biden may very well end up picking a running mate from the Sun Belt Sanders doesn't really have any other realistic path than retaking PA, MI, WI and potentially sacrificing a Senate seat in WI would be a prize worth paying to get the presidency. Unlike Biden who has 6-7 solid options Sanders doesn't have many good options (unless he picks an outsider) that are both female, experienced, at least 15 years younger than him and progressive enough to be acceptable to his base and loyal to his project, and if he were to win the nomination I'd expect Baldwin to start as the odds-on favourite. Sorry but that’s rubbish; without control of the Senate a President Sanders is largely impotent and would have to rely on Executive Orders to do anything vaguely significant domestically (ask Obama about his second term). Forget the map, it’s been eons since a VP pick altered the electoral map - Gore maybe, just maybe, helped Clinton in Tennessee second time around, but Biden, Cheney, John Edwards, Quayle, Bentsen and Pence made not one jot of positive difference. You pick a Veep to help where you’re weak, so if the argument is that Sanders is strong in the Rust Belt anyway picking a VP from there is a waste of a pick. I don’t necessarily buy into the experience argument either - so here’s a name to consider, Pramila Jayapal from Washington has just gone from advising Warren on her healthcare for all package to endorsing Sanders. A woman, of minority ethnicity, young-ish, progressive, from a State they shouldn’t have to worry about so can spend her time in more battleground States. To consider also (regretfully) is an openly lesbian nominee posing on stage with her same sex spouse going to do much to win over the social conservative Reagan Democrats in the Midwest, who fled from Obama to Trump partly because of his pledge to nominate anti Roe v Wade judges, crack down on immigration, etc? On average, VP picks make 1-2 points of difference in their home states, greater than the margins by which MI, WI and PA were won in 2016. "From the midwest" is something Sanders shouldn't have an issue with, but being from one of the target states specifically would offer a healthy boost.
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Post by curiousliberal on Jan 19, 2020 21:51:26 GMT
I don't know if Vermont-Hawaii really are the winning ticket for Dems in these elections... (Delaware-Massachusetts aren't really appealing either of course !)
I think it's a balanced ticket in more ways than one. So balanced it'll risk an independent Howard Schultz run supported by ex-Clintonites. Sanders doesn't have to make an Establishment (TM) pick, but Gabbard (or Nina Turner) is a needlessly red flag to fly in the face of what will presumably be (assuming he is nominated) a very wounded half of a divided party. I can see the case for her providing electoral gain, but (a)she's probably too much of a loose cannon and has baggage that may backfire very heavily in a GE (especially with an older candidate at the top of the ticket), and (b)due to the paragraph above, if anyone would benefit from it, that'd be Biden. I've suspected she was angling for that for a while, actually, given her defence of him on renouncing his Iraq vote in contrast to the 'Hillary is a neocon' schtick.
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Post by curiousliberal on Jan 19, 2020 20:48:20 GMT
Montana Senator Jon Tester has endorsed no-hoper Michael Bennet, which is a bit of a snub to Biden. Politico have edited the article to add that Tester 'is supportive [of Bennet's campaign], but has not endorsed'.
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Post by curiousliberal on Jan 19, 2020 19:43:49 GMT
I expect Bennet will be next to drop out. Well, everyone has expected that for many months, and he is still running. But of course at some point all the people predicting Bennet will be the next to drop out will eventually be right. Not if the Bennet Bros have anything to say about it.
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Post by curiousliberal on Jan 18, 2020 3:27:26 GMT
National poll from SurveyUSA with Sanders gaining 4 points on Biden, and Bloomberg tied with Buttigieg. The change is from November, where Harris polled 5%, Booker 2% and Castro 1%, so Warren and Buttigieg losing support is remarkable. Biden 32% (nc) Sanders 21% (+4) Warren 14% (-2) Buttigieg 9% (-3) Bloomberg 9% (new) Yang 4% (nc) Steyer 3% (+1) Klobuchar 2% (nc) Gabbard 2% (+1) Other 1% (nc) Undecided 3% (-1) www.surveyusa.com/client/PollReport.aspx?g=b4747822-277e-4d2c-b896-eb4e04672c09Didn't Warren peak in late October-early November? It strikes me as a poor indicator for the health of her campaign, but not shocking. Edit: it's good for Bloomberg, though - he appears to be gaining steam now, though it might be worth nothing if voters abandon him for deigning not to participate in the early contests (when the Iowa/NH/NV/SC bounces actually happen, that is). He's also had a few congressional endorsements, which I suppose makes sense giving his fundraising potential for cash-strapped 2020 candidates.
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Post by curiousliberal on Jan 17, 2020 21:18:43 GMT
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Post by curiousliberal on Jan 17, 2020 16:36:39 GMT
Surely the Democrats get to define how the winner of Democrats contests is called? They did that in the past by only initially publishing final state delegate totals, but the divergence between that and the popular vote last time (as well as Clinton winning 8/8 coin flips during the caucuses) caused some uproar and the Iowa Party hopes to prevent that with transparency. They’re now planning to immediately publish the popular vote and an intermediate measure, because a four-way race in which three different people can claim to have won definitely won’t be controversial /s. Winning the most delegates is still technically winning the state, but real-time publishing of these novel metrics may allow aggressive spin and expectations management to neutralise much of an Iowa bounce. IMO more transparency is a good thing, but this will ultimately is likely to turn Democrats outside Iowa against their caucus format. I prefer proportional electoral systems, but there’s so much jiggery-pokery involved that opponents will easily be able to cast this election as something quite different.
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Post by curiousliberal on Jan 17, 2020 3:26:52 GMT
Perhaps it's overly bold to assume the election would have happened in the circumstances it did if Cable were leader. What you you think he would have done differently that could have changed the circumstances? Being a bit more supportive of a GNU (even a hypothetically Labour-led GNU with Corbyn around) would have turned the political heat onto Labour and independent MPs, perhaps enough for them to buckle. It was one of those 'damaging in a GE, but a pragmatic way to improve governance' moves we were supposed to be capable of, and Cable was - not always to his credit - a bit of a schemer. He might have been able to convince some people who felt unable to support one when Swinson was in charge (and apparently did a fair bit to get defectors on board, though she deserves primary credit for presiding over those results). However, this strategy would have been particularly intimidating towards a Scottish MP considering our current Scottish strategy and the presence of the SNP in a hypothetical GNU. Not adopting Revoke (or his more competent style of leadership in general as opposed to Swinson's) might have provided insufficient encouragement for other parties (Labour/Conservatives etc) to move events towards a December GE. I doubt it was much of a factor, but can't rule it out as Johnson and Corbyn haven't been 100% forthcoming about the political calculations involved at the time.
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Post by curiousliberal on Jan 16, 2020 22:19:16 GMT
An example of the non-ideological/low info swing voter, a group that's bigger than the moderate/centrist swing voters. Lower in theory but how much so in practice, considering their depressed turnout?
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Post by curiousliberal on Jan 16, 2020 18:07:11 GMT
It's really interesting that Sanders seems to have pulled ahead of Warren - something I wasn't anticipating. I thought she would win out in the "not Biden" battle. Sanders always had a bigger base and the groups he appeals to (youth, workers/poor people, hispanics, apolitical/marginal voters) are more numerous than Warren's base, but their turnout rate is lower, so how well Sanders polls depend on the pollster's turnout model. The (more or less woke) college educated white middle class is a clear minority within the party, and a lot of candidates competed for that vote Harris (who never really appealed to black voters), Booker, Castro, Gillibrand, Beto, Warren, Buttigieg). One of the interesting elements in this primary is that the non-white candidates didn't really appeal to PoC (with the exception of Yang's support among East and SE Asians). The big shifts in candidate support have mainly been due to college educated whites moving between - primarily - Harris, Warren and Buttigieg. Meanwhile Biden and Sanders have both held on to their bases. Professor Warren never really managed to cut into Sanders' core support, she's not a natural populist like him, too much wonkiness, wokeness, and lack of authenticity. It's worth noting here the typical pro-Sanders complaint (besides 'corporations are rigging polls' at the rabid end of his support) is that some polls' turnout models are essentially the same for primary and general elections, and based off general election turnout models that, in their view, don't count out the probability of higher turnout within his base where they have a choice to vote for a candidate they rather like. If they're right, it could explain his 2016 overperformance in e.g. Michigan (though primary polls have traditionally notoriously wobbly anyway due to lower sample sizes) and would point to him being undersold by topline polling numbers alone. Whether he's being undersold by the betting markets/general expectations/punditry is another matter, of course; IMO he had a bit of that up until the last month or so, but the principal underselling has been of Biden's chances and remains so.
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Post by curiousliberal on Jan 15, 2020 23:46:51 GMT
FiveThirtyEight's post-debate poll provides an early indicator that Warren's gambit may have paid off. She had the best night besides Klobuchar in terms of boosting favourability (and for Klobuchar and Steyer, a good proportion of their gains came from being previously little-known candidates on a stage of 6). Warren also saw a jump in voters considering her, whilst Sanders lost some favourability but inched forward a bit in terms of voters considering him. Probably not that consequential, but this may encourage her to make more use of this line. The Sanders campaign is never happy about their coverage even when it's more than fair, but they have a right to grumpy about the framing of the CNN questions in this debate, as nelson indicated. Perhaps the worst of that was this line of questioning: Moderator: 'Did you say [statement indicating belief that a woman couldn't win win]?' Sanders: 'No.' Moderator: (To Warren) 'When he said [the statement], how did you react?'
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Post by curiousliberal on Jan 15, 2020 6:02:06 GMT
I'm not sure why this quiz picked 9 Democrats rather than all 12 candidates (just go the whole hog if you're going to do 9, IMHO). I've probably ended up with results I didn't expect because a lot of my answers (on e.g. fracking and tuition fees) were 'not yet' or 'yes, but I'd prefer to back the absolutist here because their eventual compromise would be closer to my preferred outcome'. The quiz's format was a lot more nuance-free than your typical ISideWith set. That said, I got: Yang 13, Steyer 12, Buttigieg/Klobuchar 11, Biden/Sanders 10, Bloomberg/Gabbard 9, Warren 8. I had thought Warren would score highest.
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Post by curiousliberal on Jan 14, 2020 23:34:39 GMT
Perhaps it's overly bold to assume the election would have happened in the circumstances it did if Cable were leader.
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