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Post by Andrew_S on Mar 24, 2022 13:37:05 GMT
The Dissolution and Calling of Parliament Act 2022 has received Royal Assent. The FTPA is no more. It was always rather symbolic because a simple majority was able to override it as we saw in 2019.
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The Bishop
Labour
Down With Factionalism!
Posts: 36,546
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Post by The Bishop on Mar 24, 2022 13:54:51 GMT
Indeed, but it can also be argued that the circumstances of late 2019 were somewhat unusual.
I still think the idea behind it - to make the calling of a GE dependent on more than the then PM's whims - is a sound one, even if it was somewhat poorly executed.
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Post by islington on Mar 24, 2022 13:55:41 GMT
The Dissolution and Calling of Parliament Act 2022 has received Royal Assent. The FTPA is no more. It was always rather symbolic because a simple majority was able to override it as we saw in 2019. Well, yes, but it meant going through the process of actually passing an Act, plus the HoL might theoretically have delayed it. Now the process of calling a GE should be much less rigmarolious. (That is a word for which I'm indebted to my wife. I acknowledge it's not in the OED, but it ought to be.)
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Post by johnhemming on Mar 24, 2022 13:56:31 GMT
The principle should be understood that concentrating too much power in one person's hands is a bad idea.
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YL
Non-Aligned
Either Labour leaning or Lib Dem leaning but not sure which
Posts: 4,288
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Post by YL on Mar 24, 2022 14:01:26 GMT
Indeed, but it can also be argued that the circumstances of late 2019 were somewhat unusual. I still think the idea behind it - to make the calling of a GE dependent on more than the then PM's whims - is a sound one, even if it was somewhat poorly executed. Of course it was originally passed in the context of the Coalition and ensured that Cameron couldn't just call a General Election over the Lib Dems' heads without the Commons' agreement. And if another coalition government, of whatever composition, appears in the future I suspect a similar act may be passed again.
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Post by Peter Wilkinson on Mar 24, 2022 14:02:13 GMT
Labour landslide in the January 2025 GE??? ?? ? ? ? ? ?
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Post by islington on Mar 24, 2022 15:01:45 GMT
The principle should be understood that concentrating too much power in one person's hands is a bad idea. I acknowledge the risk but equally it's important that the Government should be able to function. In this case the power we're restoring to the PM is effectively to be able to place the matter in the hands of the electorate. I understand the concern that a Government might try to take advantage of a possibly temporary burst of popularity to grab itself a further five years in power. But past experience suggests that this risk is more theoretical than real because it's a fairly obvious ploy and the PM would be taking a big risk in assuming that the voters won't see through it. Plus of course the campaign will allow the Opposition several weeks to stress this theme if they wish. The best examples I can think of in recent times are Ted Heath in Feb 1974 and Theresa May in 2017 and in both cases I think something that told quite heavily against them was a widespread sense that a GE was not necessary at that time and that it had been called for opportunistic reasons. The outcome of those elections should serve to make any future PM think very hard before rushing to the country when the Gov't has a majority and there is plenty of time to go before a GE is needed. The situation in 2019 was quite different in that the Gov't lacked a majority and could not get its central policy through the HoC. That's exactly the sort of situation in which you need to be able to refer the matter to the voters in the hope that they will deliver a clear decision one way or the other.
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Post by Wisconsin on Mar 24, 2022 15:02:31 GMT
I still wish there was more clarity on whether the monarch can refuse the PM’s dissolution request if he or she has already lost the confidence of Commons and is acting in bad faith.
This is all the Government’s ‘Dissolution Principles’ say:
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“In restoring the pre-2011 Act position, the United Kingdom is returning to a position where the Prime Minister (by virtue of commanding the confidence of the House of Commons), can advise the Sovereign to dissolve Parliament at a time of their choosing.
The circumstances in which a Prime Minister might seek a dissolution are underpinned by two core constitutional principles:
- The Prime Minister holds that position by virtue of their ability to command the confidence of the House of Commons and will normally be the accepted leader of the political party that commands the majority of the House of Commons.
- The Sovereign should not be drawn into party politics, and it is the responsibility of those involved in the political process to ensure that remains the case. As the Crown’s principal adviser this responsibility falls particularly on the incumbent Prime Minister.
A return to the pre-2011 status quo ante will also restore the position whereby the Prime Minister, having lost a designated or explicit vote of confidence, can either resign or seek a dissolution, which would usually be granted and lead to an election.
The Sovereign, by convention, is informed by and acts upon the advice of the Prime Minister so long as the Government appears to have the confidence of the House, and the Prime Minister maintains support as the leader of that Government.”
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J.G.Harston
Lib Dem
Leave-voting Brexit-supporting Liberal Democrat
Posts: 13,622
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Post by J.G.Harston on Mar 24, 2022 15:06:10 GMT
Labour landslide in the January 2025 GE??? ?? ? ? ? ? ? Good god, not another winter election.
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Post by islington on Mar 24, 2022 15:10:01 GMT
I still wish there was more clarity on whether the monarch can refuse the PM’s dissolution request if he or she has already lost the confidence of Commons and is acting in bad faith. This is all the Government’s ‘Dissolution Principles’ say: — “In restoring the pre-2011 Act position, the United Kingdom is returning to a position where the Prime Minister (by virtue of commanding the confidence of the House of Commons), can advise the Sovereign to dissolve Parliament at a time of their choosing. The circumstances in which a Prime Minister might seek a dissolution are underpinned by two core constitutional principles: - The Prime Minister holds that position by virtue of their ability to command the confidence of the House of Commons and will normally be the accepted leader of the political party that commands the majority of the House of Commons. - The Sovereign should not be drawn into party politics, and it is the responsibility of those involved in the political process to ensure that remains the case. As the Crown’s principal adviser this responsibility falls particularly on the incumbent Prime Minister. A return to the pre-2011 status quo ante will also restore the position whereby the Prime Minister, having lost a designated or explicit vote of confidence, can either resign or seek a dissolution, which would usually be granted and lead to an election. The Sovereign, by convention, is informed by and acts upon the advice of the Prime Minister so long as the Government appears to have the confidence of the House, and the Prime Minister maintains support as the leader of that Government.” This is a difficult thing to provide for in legislation because we can't anticipate all the circumstances in which such a question might arise. I'd argue that a prudent monarch would not refuse a GE request from a Gov't that has previously enjoyed (even if it no longer retains) the express or implied confidence of the current HoC. If the Gov't has never enjoyed the confidence of the current HoC, then it wouldn't be entitled to a GE and should get one only if there's no prospect of forming an alternative Gov't that would be acceptable to the HoC.
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Post by Peter Wilkinson on Mar 24, 2022 16:44:52 GMT
I still wish there was more clarity on whether the monarch can refuse the PM’s dissolution request if he or she has already lost the confidence of Commons and is acting in bad faith. This is all the Government’s ‘Dissolution Principles’ say: — “In restoring the pre-2011 Act position, the United Kingdom is returning to a position where the Prime Minister (by virtue of commanding the confidence of the House of Commons), can advise the Sovereign to dissolve Parliament at a time of their choosing. The circumstances in which a Prime Minister might seek a dissolution are underpinned by two core constitutional principles: - The Prime Minister holds that position by virtue of their ability to command the confidence of the House of Commons and will normally be the accepted leader of the political party that commands the majority of the House of Commons. - The Sovereign should not be drawn into party politics, and it is the responsibility of those involved in the political process to ensure that remains the case. As the Crown’s principal adviser this responsibility falls particularly on the incumbent Prime Minister. A return to the pre-2011 status quo ante will also restore the position whereby the Prime Minister, having lost a designated or explicit vote of confidence, can either resign or seek a dissolution, which would usually be granted and lead to an election. The Sovereign, by convention, is informed by and acts upon the advice of the Prime Minister so long as the Government appears to have the confidence of the House, and the Prime Minister maintains support as the leader of that Government.” This is a difficult thing to provide for in legislation because we can't anticipate all the circumstances in which such a question might arise. I'd argue that a prudent monarch would not refuse a GE request from a Gov't that has previously enjoyed (even if it no longer retains) the express or implied confidence of the current HoC. If the Gov't has never enjoyed the confidence of the current HoC, then it wouldn't be entitled to a GE and should get one only if there's no prospect of forming an alternative Gov't that would be acceptable to the HoC. The problem, I think, comes with the precise interpretation of your final paragraph, particularly considering the almost forgotten narrow avoidance of a constitutional crisis in 1834/35. A necessary first point to make is that in the autumn of 1834, it was still not absolutely the case that the Sovereign was required to act only on the advice of the Prime Minister - and therefore William IV, feeling that reform had gone far enough, felt able to dismiss the Whig Prime Minister, Lord Melbourne, despite the fact that Melbourne clearly had a Commons majority at the time. However, there were some indications that the Whigs were less popular and the Tories more so in the country at large, and the King asked the Tory Duke of Wellington to form a new government, and call a general election in the likely event that it would be necessary to do so to get a Tory Commons majority. There was then some delay in this, because Wellington declined to be Prime Minister except on a very interim basis, and advised the King to call upon Robert Peel (who happened to be out of the country at the time) instead. When Peel returned and agreed, a general election was duly called for January 1835. When the results came through, the Tories had gained seats but Peel still only had a Commons minority. Nevertheless, he tried to run a minority government for a couple of months in the hope that there would be enough differences between the Whigs and their Radical and Irish allies to let him do so, but in April accepted that this was not possible, and resigned. At this point, despite the clear fact that the previous Whig government still had a majority in the new Parliament, William IV apparently suggested that Peel should remain as Prime Minister and call another general election. Peel, backed by Wellington, argued that doing this would be futile, insisted on resigning and advised the King to reappoint Melbourne as Prime Minister. The King, somewhat reluctantly, did so. Within a very few years of this, it seems to have become accepted constitutional doctrine that the Sovereign should not act without getting, and abiding by, the advice of the Prime Minister. It is probably pointless to speculate about what would have happened if Peel had called another general election in April 1835 - apart from remarking that William IV would probably have left a rather more controversial reputation. However, it very much leaves the question of what the Sovereign can, or indeed must, do if a Prime Minister in a situation like that of Peel in April 1835 tried to do what Peel refused to do then, advising the Sovereign, against the facts, that there is no prospect of an alternative government that would be acceptable to the current Commons. Is the Sovereign required to believe the Prime Minister? Or are they required to believe in the evidence of their own eyes?
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Post by greenhert on Mar 24, 2022 17:08:56 GMT
Whilst expected, the repeal of the Fixed Term Parliaments Act is disappointing news for Britain overall. It was designed to ensure better political stability and avert unnecessary snap elections (sadly it did not actually achieve this in reality).
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Post by islington on Mar 24, 2022 17:11:20 GMT
This is a difficult thing to provide for in legislation because we can't anticipate all the circumstances in which such a question might arise. I'd argue that a prudent monarch would not refuse a GE request from a Gov't that has previously enjoyed (even if it no longer retains) the express or implied confidence of the current HoC. If the Gov't has never enjoyed the confidence of the current HoC, then it wouldn't be entitled to a GE and should get one only if there's no prospect of forming an alternative Gov't that would be acceptable to the HoC. The problem, I think, comes with the precise interpretation of your final paragraph, particularly considering the almost forgotten narrow avoidance of a constitutional crisis in 1834/35. A necessary first point to make is that in the autumn of 1834, it was still not absolutely the case that the Sovereign was required to act only on the advice of the Prime Minister - and therefore William IV, feeling that reform had gone far enough, felt able to dismiss the Whig Prime Minister, Lord Melbourne, despite the fact that Melbourne clearly had a Commons majority at the time. However, there were some indications that the Whigs were less popular and the Tories more so in the country at large, and the King asked the Tory Duke of Wellington to form a new government, and call a general election in the likely event that it would be necessary to do so to get a Tory Commons majority. There was then some delay in this, because Wellington declined to be Prime Minister except on a very interim basis, and advised the King to call upon Robert Peel (who happened to be out of the country at the time) instead. When Peel returned and agreed, a general election was duly called for January 1835. When the results came through, the Tories had gained seats but Peel still only had a Commons minority. Nevertheless, he tried to run a minority government for a couple of months in the hope that there would be enough differences between the Whigs and their Radical and Irish allies to let him do so, but in April accepted that this was not possible, and resigned. At this point, despite the clear fact that the previous Whig government still had a majority in the new Parliament, William IV apparently suggested that Peel should remain as Prime Minister and call another general election. Peel, backed by Wellington, argued that doing this would be futile, insisted on resigning and advised the King to reappoint Melbourne as Prime Minister. The King, somewhat reluctantly, did so. Within a very few years of this, it seems to have become accepted constitutional doctrine that the Sovereign should not act without getting, and abiding by, the advice of the Prime Minister. It is probably pointless to speculate about what would have happened if Peel had called another general election in April 1835 - apart from remarking that William IV would probably have left a rather more controversial reputation. However, it very much leaves the question of what the Sovereign can, or indeed must, do if a Prime Minister in a situation like that of Peel in April 1835 tried to do what Peel refused to do then, advising the Sovereign, against the facts, that there is no prospect of an alternative government that would be acceptable to the current Commons. Is the Sovereign required to believe the Prime Minister? Or are they required to believe in the evidence of their own eyes? Well, it's a fascinating question. I'm guessing that the Queen's personal advisors war-game this kind of situation. The most sensible outcome would be for the Opposition to table a formal motion of no confidence in HMG. If this motion fails, then the PM has received the confidence of the House and is entitled to continue in office and can have a GE if he wants one. If the motion passes, then under our adversarial system that is an implied vote of confidence in LotO as PM, so the monarch would appoint him (and he likewise would be entitled to a GE if he wanted one). If the LotO declined to take office, then I presume the PM would continue despite losing the no-confidence vote. For instance, Gladstone's government lost a key vote, which I think it had indicated was one of confidence, in 1873. Gladstone resigned and the Queen, very properly, sent for Disraeli as LotO. Disraeli, however, had shrewdly calculated that the gov't had run out of steam and would do itself further discredit if it stayed in office. So, with admirable political sang-froid, he decined to form a gov't and Gladstone continued. (And at the GE the following year the soundness of Disraeli's assessment was confirmed as the Tories won their first outright majority since 1841.)
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Post by Merseymike on Mar 24, 2022 17:21:26 GMT
Whilst expected, the repeal of the Fixed Term Parliaments Act is disappointing news for Britain overall. It was designed to ensure better political stability and avert unnecessary snap elections (sadly it did not actually achieve this in reality). This is the problem. Because there was no real commitment to the principle of a fixed term and not having elections other than at the allocated time, we had two elections which should not have happened at all.
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Post by islington on Mar 25, 2022 8:39:54 GMT
Whilst expected, the repeal of the Fixed Term Parliaments Act is disappointing news for Britain overall. It was designed to ensure better political stability and avert unnecessary snap elections (sadly it did not actually achieve this in reality). This is the problem. Because there was no real commitment to the principle of a fixed term and not having elections other than at the allocated time, we had two elections which should not have happened at all. I agree 2017 was not necessary. It was the result of opportunism on the part of Theresa May, leavened with a fair measure of hubris, and it got the outcome it deserved.
But 2019 was absolutely necessary. There was a logjam at Westminster that was doing serious political damage and was beginning to harm the constitution. A GE was needed to clear that logjam and it succeeded in that.
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Post by Merseymike on Mar 25, 2022 9:58:09 GMT
This is the problem. Because there was no real commitment to the principle of a fixed term and not having elections other than at the allocated time, we had two elections which should not have happened at all. I agree 2017 was not necessary. It was the result of opportunism on the part of Theresa May, leavened with a fair measure of hubris, and it got the outcome it deserved. But 2019 was absolutely necessary. There was a logjam at Westminster that was doing serious political damage and was beginning to harm the constitution. A GE was needed to clear that logjam and it succeeded in that.
The logjam existed because of the unwillingness of MPs to compromise on both sides, whereas the closeness of the referendum outcome indicated that compromise was exactly what was required - a soft Brexit, taking on board the outcome of the referendum but its close nature. MPs should have recognised this, particularly on the remain side If they had not had the option of dissolving Parliament then that would have happened.
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Post by islington on Mar 25, 2022 10:05:20 GMT
At the risk of going off-topic, here's another one if you enjoy playing these constitutional games.
Suppose a gov't, that has hitherto enjoyed the clear confidence of the current HoC (i.e. it has got majorities for its budgets and Queen's Speeches), seeks to quell a backbench revolt on a key upcoming vote - say, the second reading of a controversial Bill - by declaring it to be one of confidence.
But the backbenchers rebel anyway, and the Bill is defeated.
The PM thereupon neither resigns nor seeks a GE. He simply announces that the gov't will drop the Bill from its legislative programme and in other respects carry on as before.
In my view, this is unconstitutional because, having declared the matter to be one of confidence, the gov't has to abide by the consequences of its defeat.
- Do you agree?
- If you do agree, do you think the monarch would then be justified in exercising the in-abeyance-since-1834 prerogative of dismissing the PM and inviting the LotO to form a government?
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Post by islington on Mar 25, 2022 10:22:04 GMT
I agree 2017 was not necessary. It was the result of opportunism on the part of Theresa May, leavened with a fair measure of hubris, and it got the outcome it deserved. But 2019 was absolutely necessary. There was a logjam at Westminster that was doing serious political damage and was beginning to harm the constitution. A GE was needed to clear that logjam and it succeeded in that.
The logjam existed because of the unwillingness of MPs to compromise on both sides, whereas the closeness of the referendum outcome indicated that compromise was exactly what was required - a soft Brexit, taking on board the outcome of the referendum but its close nature. MPs should have recognised this, particularly on the remain side If they had not had the option of dissolving Parliament then that would have happened. Sorry, Mike, but I think what you describe is the polar opposite of what actually happened.
Opposition parties, plus some Tories on the remain side, made up a sufficient majority to pass legislation continually kicking the tin can down the road in terms of the date of officially leaving the EU, and in addition giving the gov't detailed instructions about how to conduct its negotiations. The only reason they were able to do this is that the FTPA meant that the gov't was not at liberty to do what it surely would otherwise have done, namely call a GE.
I don't so much blame the opposition parties for this because it is, after all, their role to oppose. But I do blame remainer MPs, of whichever party, who were trying to overturn the 2016 referendum (to be fair, there were plenty of other remainer MPs who accepted they had lost in 2016 and did not try to overturn the result). I also blame Speaker Bercow, who broke with long-settled precedent and issued a number of rulings to assist remainer MPs in hijacking the role of government.
This unhealthy situation would have persisted if ONPM Jo Swinson had not been seduced by some favourable polling into thinking the Lib Dems had more to gain than to lose from an early GE.
('ONPM' = 'Our Next Prime Minister')
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Post by Merseymike on Mar 25, 2022 11:17:14 GMT
The logjam existed because of the unwillingness of MPs to compromise on both sides, whereas the closeness of the referendum outcome indicated that compromise was exactly what was required - a soft Brexit, taking on board the outcome of the referendum but its close nature. MPs should have recognised this, particularly on the remain side If they had not had the option of dissolving Parliament then that would have happened. Sorry, Mike, but I think what you describe is the polar opposite of what actually happened. Opposition parties, plus some Tories on the remain side, made up a sufficient majority to pass legislation continually kicking the tin can down the road in terms of the date of officially leaving the EU, and in addition giving the gov't detailed instructions about how to conduct its negotiations. The only reason they were able to do this is that the FTPA meant that the gov't was not at liberty to do what it surely would otherwise have done, namely call a GE. I don't so much blame the opposition parties for this because it is, after all, their role to oppose. But I do blame remainer MPs, of whichever party, who were trying to overturn the 2016 referendum (to be fair, there were plenty of other remainer MPs who accepted they had lost in 2016 and did not try to overturn the result). I also blame Speaker Bercow, who broke with long-settled precedent and issued a number of rulings to assist remainer MPs in hijacking the role of government. This unhealthy situation would have persisted if ONPM Jo Swinson had not been seduced by some favourable polling into thinking the Lib Dems had more to gain than to lose from an early GE. ('ONPM' = 'Our Next Prime Minister')
No, its high time MP's started acting like adults and stopped their games. Remainer MP's should indeed have accepted the result, and indeed, Jeremy Corbyn was happy to do so and would have supported May's deal, but couldn't get it through. However, leavers also scuppered that deal because it wasn't hardline enough for them. Government should not have the option of calling an election just because it can't get its way, but MP's need to start behaving in a more responsible manner. I want the role of government to be made difficult, though. particularly when no UK government is ever really legitimate anyway owing to the electoral system. Thats why we currently have no-one worth voting for and why unless there is a clear commitment to electoral reform, I will not be voting again.
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Post by Merseymike on Mar 25, 2022 11:18:41 GMT
At the risk of going off-topic, here's another one if you enjoy playing these constitutional games. Suppose a gov't, that has hitherto enjoyed the clear confidence of the current HoC (i.e. it has got majorities for its budgets and Queen's Speeches), seeks to quell a backbench revolt on a key upcoming vote - say, the second reading of a controversial Bill - by declaring it to be one of confidence. But the backbenchers rebel anyway, and the Bill is defeated. The PM thereupon neither resigns nor seeks a GE. He simply announces that the gov't will drop the Bill from its legislative programme and in other respects carry on as before. In my view, this is unconstitutional because, having declared the matter to be one of confidence, the gov't has to abide by the consequences of its defeat. - Do you agree?
- If you do agree, do you think the monarch would then be justified in exercising the in-abeyance-since-1834 prerogative of dismissing the PM and inviting the LotO to form a government?
No , and no. There should be no 'confidence' motions, and it is up to MP's to sort out a governing coalition, which is the norm in democratic countries with a proper electoral system.
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